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I. INTRODUCTION
Despite extensive debates surrounding the scope of the contextual
element of crimes against humanity during the 1998 negotiations
leading up to the formal establishment of the permanent International
Criminal Court (ICC), the meaning of the so-called State or
organizational policy requirement contained in Article 7(2)(a) of the
Rome Statute remains unsettled over a decade later.1 The origins of
this ambiguity can be traced to its earliest legal use in the Nuremberg
International Military Tribunal immediately after World War II, and
the corresponding vagueness of its subsequent interpretation and
uncertain status in customary international law.2 This lack of clarity
has persisted throughout the more recent history of international
criminal law.
Part of the problem is that, unlike the crime of genocide, which has
a widely accepted definition in the 1948 Genocide Convention, or war
crimes, which are codified in the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their
additional protocols, there is no single treaty addressing crimes against
1. See Darryl Robinson, The Elements of Crimes Against Humanity, in THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: ELEMENTS OF CRIMES AND RULES OF
PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 57, 57–80 (Roy S. Lee ed., 2001) (detailing the
concerns of States Parties during the course of negotiations on language pertaining
to crimes against humanity in the Rome Statute and the ICC’s Elements of
Crimes).
2. See Larissa van den Herik & Elies van Sliedregt, Removing or
Reincarnating the Policy Requirement of Crimes Against Humanity: An
Introductory Note, 23 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 825 (2010) (highlighting that “[o]f the
three existing core crimes in international criminal law, crimes against humanity is
the most elusive one, a chameleonic crime that can change colour over time, since
it does not possess an unambiguous conceptual character.”).
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humanity.3 Thus, despite the centrality of the offense to modern
international prosecution efforts,4 various definitions of the crime and
its contextual and other elements have been developed and used in
different national5 and international6 contexts over the years.
3. See FORGING A CONVENTION FOR CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY (Leila N.
Sadat ed., 2011) (presenting a Proposed International Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Humanity, along with a number of
related academic articles, based on the collaboration of some 250 scholars). It is
only recently that an attempt has been made to codify crimes against humanity in a
single convention. While a significant step forward, this effort was undertaken by
leading experts, not by States. It is hoped that the instrument will at least serve as a
template for a convention and that States will eventually see the light and adopt a
crimes against humanity treaty. Id.
4. See Leila N. Sadat, Emerging from the Shadow of Nuremberg: Crimes
Against Humanity in the Modern Age, WASH. UNIV. IN ST. LOUIS SCH. OF LAW, at
16–18 (Wash. Univ. in St. Louis Legal Studies Paper Ser. No. 11-11-04, 2012),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2013254
(observing that only a “handful” of States, most notably Israel and France, have
incorporated crimes against humanity into their domestic law, while prosecutions
for crimes against humanity have been highly significant in the work of the recent
international tribunals for the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, East
Timor, and Cambodia).
5. See, e.g., Attorney General of Israel v. Demjanjuk, Trial Judgment, District
Court of Jerusalem (Apr. 18, 1988); CrimA 347/88, Demjanjuk v. State of Israel,
Isr. SC 221 (1993); Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann, Trial Judgment,
District Court of Jerusalem (Dec. 12, 1961); Appeals Judgment, Supreme Court of
Israel (May 29, 1962); Nazis and Nazi Collaborators -Punishment- Law- 57101950, ISR. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFA
Archive/1950_1959/Nazis%20and%20Nazi%20Collaborators%20-Punishment-%
20Law-%20571 (last visited Sept. 30, 2012) (defining crimes against humanity as
“any of the following acts: murder, extermination, enslavement, starvation or
deportation and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population,
and persecution on national, racial, religious or political grounds”).
6. See, e.g., Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone art. 2, Jan. 16, 2002,
http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=uClnd1MJeEw%3d&tabid=176
(giving the Special Court power to prosecute individuals responsible for murder;
extermination; enslavement; deportation; imprisonment; torture; rape sexual
slavery, forced prostitution or pregnancy, or other form of sexual violence;
political, racial, or religious persecution; and “other inhumane acts” in the course
of a “widespread or systematic attack” against a civilian population); Statute of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda art. 3, Nov. 6, 1994, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/955 [hereinafter ICTR Statute] (empowering the Tribunal to prosecute
persons responsible for murder; extermination enslavement; deportation;
imprisonment; torture; rape; political, racial, or religious persecution; and “other
inhumane acts” in the course of a “widespread or systematic attack” against a
civilian population based on nationality, politics, ethnicity, race, or religion);
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia art. 5,
May 25, 1993, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 [hereinafter ICTY Statute] (granting the
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Another problem is that, although crimes against humanity are a
core part of the Rome Statute, there appears to be a lack of
conceptual consensus on what makes a crime against humanity a
crime against humanity as opposed to a common offense under
domestic law. The predominant view, at least in the ICC formulation
of the crime, requires the commission of certain underlying
prohibited acts such as murder or rape as part of a widespread or
systematic attack directed against any civilian population. The
multiple commissions of the impugned acts against civilians will
give rise to crimes against humanity when carried out pursuant to, or
in furtherance of, a State or organizational policy.
But even the Rome Statute definition does not resolve the
problem. For example, Professor Darryl Robinson has identified
about four theories associated with the State or organizational policy
requirement that serve as a key component of the ICC definition of
the offense.7 The starting point is the plain textual requirement that
there must be a State policy to commit the attacks. That said, he
shows that some scholars argue that no policy element is required,
while others insist that there must be a policy.8 Similarly, regarding
the organizational aspect, some theorists claim that in the absence of
a State policy there must be an organization, but only a “State-like”
organization having some type of policy would qualify.9 Finally,
there is the even broader pro–human rights suggestion that crimes
against humanity should encompass any entity with the capacity to
Tribunal power to prosecute individuals responsible for murder; extermination;
enslavement; deportation; imprisonment; torture; rape; political, racial, or religious
persecution; and “other inhumane acts” directed against a civilian population
during an armed conflict); G.A. Res. 57/228, ¶ 5, U.N. DOC. A/RES/57/228
(Dec. 18, 2002) (referring to “crimes against humanity committed during the
regime of Democratic Kampuchea”); UNTAET, On the Amendment of UNTAET
Regulation No.2000/11 on the Organization of Courts in East Timor and UNTAET
Regulation No.2000/30 on the Transitional Rules of Criminal Procedure, § 9, U.N.
Doc. UNTAET/REG/2001/25 (Sep. 14, 2001) (granting the East Timor District
Court in Dili exclusive jurisdiction to try crimes against humanity, not further
defined, committed between Jan. 1 and Oct. 25, 1999).
7. Darryl Robinson, Essence of Crimes Against Humanity Raised at ICC,
BLOG OF THE EUR. J. OF INT’L L. (Sept. 27, 2011), http://www.ejiltalk.org/essenceof-crimes-against-humanity-raised-by-challenges-at-icc (drawing the theories from
the text of the Rome Statute, recent ICC cases relating to violence in Kenya, the
jurisprudence of international tribunals, and scholarly literature).
8. Id.
9. Id.
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carry out crimes against humanity.10 The latter category would
presumably include some of the judges at the ICC who have
advanced, in a seminal decision that will be discussed later, the socalled Basic Human Values Test as the determinative criterion for
the classification of a prohibited act as a crime against humanity.
As Professor Margaret deGuzman has rightly observed, “because
of its disorganized history, important normative and doctrinal
questions remain unanswered” about this offense.11 Indeed, as she
rightly noted, “the context required to qualify an inhumane act as
crimes against humanity is subject to considerable controversy.”12
She went on to uncover several normative visions competing with
each other as rationales purporting to explain the categorization
crimes against humanity: as addressing a threat to international peace
and security, gravity and the conscience of humanity, State
involvement and action, and as prohibition in respect of group-based
harm.13
In other words, despite its frequent invocation in contemporary
legal and popular discourse, it is not entirely clear what is the
distinguishing characteristic or feature of a crime against humanity
that moves it from the realm of the domestic to the international,
such that its commission would attract the interest and condemnation
of the international community as a whole. Is it because of State or
organizational involvement in perpetrating or condoning the
underlying heinous acts? Or is it the widespread or systematic scale
of the attacks against ordinary civilians that constitutes such an
affront to human dignity that catapults the offense into the
stratosphere of crimes against all of humanity? Perhaps it is the
combination of each of these factors that gives the crime its essential
character and transforms the entirety of humanity into victims?
This article does not propose to offer a full-blown theory to

10. See id. (favoring such an approach over the “State-like” organization theory
for its flexibility of potential applications in the still-developing doctrine of crimes
against humanity).
11. Margaret M. deGuzman, Crimes Against Humanity, in ROUTLEDGE
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 121, 121 (William A. Schabas &
Nadia Bernaz eds., 2011).
12. Id. at 121.
13. Id. at 127−30.
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respond to these fundamental questions—as others have done.14
Instead, its goal is more modest in seeking to contribute to the
nascent debate on these and related issues by, firstly, exposing the
curious lack of a consensus theory for the international offense that
has such a simple label that it easily captures the popular imagination
and, secondly, highlighting the difficulties that the absence of a
common conceptual mooring poses for status quo definitions of the
crime and its interpretation and application by judges.
The paper does so by focusing on the State or organizational
policy requirement as a contextual element of crimes against
humanity, as set out in Article 7(2)(a) of the Rome Statute. I examine
this issue for several reasons. First, although the ICC’s seminal first
trial in the Thomas Lubanga case was based on war crimes instead of
crimes against humanity, there is a growing and important body of
jurisprudence from the various chambers of the Court fleshing out
the meaning of crimes against humanity. A review of the case law
discussion of the chapeau elements of that offense, in particular the
origins of the controversial State or organizational policy
requirement, allows us to take stock of where we are in terms of the
practical application of this novel body of Rome Law to concrete
ICC situations and cases. This becomes even more important
because, compared to war crimes and genocide, crimes against
humanity is the broadest and so far only residual offense available in
the category of so-called “core international crimes.”
Second, while there is a respectable body of literature on the
debate, significance, and ambiguities in the definition of crimes
against humanity agreed to by States during the Rome Statute
negotiations,15 there is a relatively sparse body of published works
14. See, e.g., David Luban, A Theory of Crimes Against Humanity, 29 YALE J.
INT’L L., Winter 2004, at 85, 90 (arguing, after locating five key characteristics of
crimes against humanity, that what sets crimes against humanity apart from other
international crimes is that it represents politics gone horribly wrong).
15. E.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW chs. 5, 7 (2d ed. 1999); Margaret de Guzman, Crimes Against
Humanity, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 121
(William A. Schabas & Nadia Bernaz eds., 2011); Simon Chesterman, An
Altogether Different Order: Defining the Elements of Crimes Against Humanity in
the Rome Statute, 10 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 307 (2000); Phyllis Hwang,
Defining Crimes Against Humanity in the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, 22 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 457 (1998); Guénaël Mettraux, Crimes
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assessing exclusively whether or not the judges of the Court are
interpreting the crime in the manner in which States mandated them
to do in Article 7 of the ICC treaty.16 Ten years after the Rome
Statute’s entry into force, it seems timely to make such an
evaluation.
Third, at the heart of the recent debates about the State or
organizational policy requirement in the Rome Statute are differing
conceptions of the origins, rationale, and ultimate future of
international criminal law—as would be applied by the ICC, its 121
States Parties as of the time of this writing, as well as by national
criminal jurisdictions. The latter are, of course, especially important
because they are supposed to incorporate the treaty into their national
laws, thereby supplying the legal framework to act as the first lines
of defense against impunity.
Fourth is a pressing question that will probably demand an answer
as the ICC regime evolves alongside, and as part of, a broader and
deeper international peace and security architecture. That is: how
might we transpose the classic definition of crimes against humanity,
frozen as it is in the State-centered logic of the interstate World War
II conflict context, and apply it to the modern non-State actor-driven
conflicts? This appears particularly significant given the increasing
Against Humanity in the Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunals for
the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 237, 278–82, 285 n.247
(2002); Darryl Robinson, Defining “Crimes Against Humanity” at the Rome
Conference, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 43 (1999); Beth Van Schaack, The Definition of
Crimes Against Humanity: Resolving the Incoherence, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L
L. 787, 841–46, 850 (1999).
16. See, e.g., LARRY MAY, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: A NORMATIVE
ACCOUNT (2004); Claus Kress, On the Outer Limits of Crimes Against Humanity:
The Concept of Organization Within the Policy Requirement: Some Reflections of
the March 2010 ICC Kenya Decision, 23 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 855, 861 (2010); Matt
Halling, Push the Envelope—Watch It Bend: Removing the Policy Requirement
and Extending Crimes Against Humanity, 23 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 827 (2010);
William A. Schabas, Prosecuting Dr. Strangelove, Goldfinger, and the Joker at the
International Criminal Court: Closing the Loopholes, 23 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 847
(2010); Thomas O. Hansen, The Policy Requirement in Crimes Against Humanity:
Lessons from and for the Case of Kenya, 43 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 1 (2011);
Sadat, supra note 4; Robinson, Essence of Crimes Against Humanity Raised at
ICC, supra note 7; Guénaël Mettraux, The Definition of Crimes Against Humanity
and the Question of a “Policy” Element, in FORGING A CONVENTION, supra note 3,
at 142 (2011); Charles C. Jalloh, Case Report: Situation in the Republic of Kenya,
105 AM. J. INT’L L. 540 (2011).

388

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[28:2

recognition among scholars of the need to resuscitate jus post bellum
(i.e., justice after war), as a foundational third pillar, to supplement
the traditional jus ad bellum (when it is just to use force) and jus in
bello (how it is just to fight in war). Indeed, given the international
community’s human rights–driven preoccupation with ascribing
individual criminal responsibility for the top wrongdoers who foment
mass crimes, it seems much more necessary to establish a firm
structural foundation for long-term peace in the aftermath of conflict
and mass atrocity.
In this regard, Professor Larry May has rightly suggested, for
instance, that it is nowadays imperative to reestablish a rule of law
that gives pride of place to protecting human rights, so as to create a
just peace after war ends.17 A just peace is simply impossible if a
measure of justice is not meted out to at least those deemed to bear
the greatest responsibility for the mass crimes committed in a given
conflict. The concern with whether crimes against humanity ought to
be redefined or at least tweaked to meet the pressing challenges of
the twenty-first century, as opposed to those of the twentieth century,
would thus seem consistent with the centrality of the idea of more
prosecutions to the second of May’s six proposed normative
principles for a jus post bellum system. Under his principle of
retribution, the top layer responsible for gross human rights
violations should either be prosecuted within the national
jurisdiction, or be extradited to international penal tribunals.18 He
assumes prosecutions as a given for the persons properly indicted by
the latter courts, carving out only a limited non-prosecution
exception in circumstances where, on balance, it can be
demonstrated that indicting or prosecuting a particular leader would
adversely affect human rights protection.19
Other scholars hold similar views. For example, Professor Brian
Orend, even as he cautioned us to think of the justice in a jus post
bellum setting in a richer way than the traditional just war theory
approach limiting it solely to the trial and punishment of war
criminals, has also suggested that at least the leaders of aggressor
17. LARRY MAY, AFTER WAR ENDS: A PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVE 16
(2012).
18. Id. pt. 1.
19. Id. at 31–32.
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rights-violating regimes ought to be tried in fair, public, and
international trials.20 He essentially used deterrence, rehabilitation,
retribution, and related theories of punishment to further justify why
all the soldiers from different sides to an armed conflict ought to be
investigated and prosecuted.21 His argument, especially when
connected with his excellent proposal for a Geneva Convention
regulating post-war justice matters, reflects a current trajectory
emphasizing the greater individual criminal responsibility that we see
for certain situations in modern international criminal justice
discourse. It therefore appears to bolster my proposal for an
expanded definition or understanding of crimes against humanity in
the world’s only permanent international criminal tribunal, which has
a crucial role to play in that regard.
For his part, Professor Carsten Stahn, in making a compelling case
for the acknowledgement of an explicit body of “post-conflict law”
to guide post-conflict peace arrangements, has sketched out six
starting principles in an important article.22 He linked two of those
rules—the norm of individual criminal responsibility and the creation
of criminal justice and reconciliation mechanisms—to an increasing
practice of the international community.23 Another goal of this article
then is to help build an explicit link between these recent jus post
bellum discussions to how crimes against humanity are defined,
interpreted, and applied to concrete situations and cases in the ICC.
This is important because it essentially affects the range and reach of
the primary international institution that virtually all the mentioned
theorists, as well as many others, agree should be supported to ensure
the crucial individual criminal accountability component is available
and deployable in any modern post-conflict justice dispensation
within its jurisdiction.
More specifically, in this article I will attempt to show that, by
narrowly limiting crimes against humanity for the purposes of ICC
prosecutions through the establishment of the State or organizational
20. Brian Orend, Jus Post Bellum: The Perspective of a Just War Theorist, 20
LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 571, 574. 591 (2007).
21. Id. at 580.
22. Carsten Stahn, ‘Jus ad Bellum’, ‘Jus in Bello’, . . . ‘Jus post Bellum’?
Rethinking the Conception of the Law of Armed Force, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 921,
938 (2006).
23. Id. at 937–38.
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policy as the key trigger for the offense, the international community
might have chosen to give a free pass to the many who could
otherwise be prosecutable if we had defined the crime more broadly
by focusing on the gravity and scale of the human rights violations
and their devastating impact on the victims. If this hunch is correct,
the effect appears perverse because it may exclude common types of
modern violence by non-State actors who do not exhibit any apparent
State or organizational policy links. This undermines the objectives
of enhancing human rights protection through prosecutions and
perhaps even the presumed deterrence and retributive value of
international criminal law. It straightjackets crimes against humanity
in such a way that the prospects for prosecuting the most responsible
leaders are dimmed. In turn, that diminishes the likelihood that we
will achieve accountability and a just and sustainable peace in
conflict-post-conflict societies.
As part of a close review of the ICC case law, I will show that
there is a split in the interpretations offered by two main judicial
camps at the ICC. The first camp is the majority view in a series of
decisions primarily arising from the Kenya Situation, which offered a
broad interpretation of crimes against humanity, while a second and
relatively narrower conception, was offered by a lone but powerful
dissenter. As each of the two approaches seems equally plausible,
and therefore equally defensible, I suggest that the ICC should make
a policy choice on which understanding to embrace, as each
interpretive stance carries significant implications for the Court’s
caseload and equally significant implications for the obligations of
its States Parties.
The question that then arises is who must make that policy
decision. I argue that while it is acceptable for the judges to decide,
and they have done so by default through the dominant position that
has emerged in the case law, given the implications of a broader
jurisdictional coverage for the Court, it is more pragmatic, more
defensible, and ultimately more legitimate for the choice to be made
by the States Parties to the Rome Statute through a formal
amendment of the current crimes against humanity definition.
As a preliminary matter, I recognize that some will likely object
that the ICC does not need an expanded crimes against humanity
jurisdiction to cover non-State actors, lest it be overwhelmed by a
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flood of situations and cases, especially given its finite resources. Yet
others might counter that my call for a statutory amendment at this
relatively early stage of the Court’s life, when it is only ten years old,
is perhaps somewhat premature. This is all the more so because we
are yet to have any successful crimes against humanity prosecutions
from the ICC.
But such objections would ignore the fact that States themselves
provided a mechanism for amendments to the Rome Statute crimes
only seven years after its entry into force under Article 121. Further,
given that I consider the Court is at a crossroads regarding what
interpretive direction to take crimes against humanity and perhaps
even the ICC itself, I believe that the proposed amendment, while not
the ideal solution, is the better one in the range of choices that the
Court currently faces. It, in any event, seems infinitely better than a
judicially led change, because it takes the heat of criticism away
from the judges who will face allegations of judicial activism and
would certainly enjoy greater legitimacy than reliance on the works
of select scholars.
This article is organized as follows. Part II examines the origins of
the State or organizational policy requirement at Nuremberg and the
narrow conception of crimes against humanity it advanced. Part III
turns to the uncertain customary international law status of the ad
hoc international tribunal conclusion that no such policy is required
for proof of the existence of crimes against humanity. Part IV
considers the relevant ICC jurisprudence to show the way the judges
have to date interpreted the State or organizational policy
requirement in the Rome Statute. The article concludes with a
tentative assessment of what my amendment proposal implies for the
ICC in particular and international criminal law more broadly.

II. ORIGINS OF THE STATE OR
ORGANIZATIONAL POLICY REQUIREMENT
A. EARLY DEFINITIONAL CHALLENGES
The lack of clarity in customary international law about the proper
scope of crimes against humanity has persisted since 1915, when
Russia, Britain, and the United States issued a joint statement
condemning the “crimes of Turkey against humanity and
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civilization” committed during the Armenian genocide.24 This
language has been traced to the Martens Clause of the Convention on
the Law and Customs of War on Land (Hague II), which referred to
the “laws of humanity and the dictates of the public conscience.”25
Following the Armenian genocide, the governments allied in
World War I signed the Treaty of Sevres. While that treaty would
have required the Ottoman Empire to assist in the arrest and
prosecution of those responsible for these crimes, it was never
ratified, and no international prosecution of the perpetrators of the
Armenian genocide ever occurred.26 The absence of an effective
international penal response to those crimes thus limited the
significance of the phrase to an acknowledgement that customary
international law arguably recognized certain crimes against
humanity, though not explicitly called as such, while also leaving the
substantive content of the crime unclear.
Although there were several other developments along the way,
most notably within the framework of the United Nations War
Crimes Commission created in London on October 20, 1943, it was
not until the establishment of the International Military Tribunal
(“IMT”) at Nuremberg in 1945 that a clear legal specification of
crimes against humanity began to take shape. Although it furnished a
basic definition of the offense, the IMT failed to clarify its exact
scope.27 The Charter of the International Military Tribunal (IMT
24. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 101–02 (2d ed. 2008)
(noting that the originally proposed formulation was “crimes against Christianity,”
rather than “humanity,” but that the three countries went with the latter term
mainly out of sensitivity to Turkey’s Muslim population).
25. Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague II) pmbl., July 29, 1899, 32
Stat. 1803, 1805, T.S. No. 403.
26. See Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Turkey
Signed at Sèvres arts. 228, 230, Aug. 10, 1920, reprinted in TREATIES OF PEACE
1919–1923 787, 862–63 (Lawrence Martin comp., 1924) (referring to “massacres
committed during the continuance of the state of war” on the territory of the former
Turkish Empire); A.E. Montgomery, The Making of the Treaty of Sèvres, 15 HIST.
J. 775 (1972) (finding that the treaty failed not only due to the rebellion leading to
the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, but also to conflicting interests
among the European Allies).
27. See Hwang, supra note 15, at 460 (pointing out that because the Tribunal
prosecuted other offenses alongside crimes against humanity, it did not, for
example, differentiate the latter from war crimes or define the term “any civilian
population”).
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Charter) established the laws and procedures to be followed in that
ad hoc special court.28 In addition to setting out the elements for
crimes against peace and war crimes—the other two offenses within
the tribunal’s subject matter jurisdiction—Article VI(c) of the IMT
Charter defined crimes against humanity as follows:
Murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane
acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war,
or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or
in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal,
whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where
perpetrated.29

The absence of a specific policy requirement in the IMT Charter
definition can most plausibly be attributed to the fact that a State plan
or policy was a basic underlying presumption of all the prosecutions
at Nuremberg, since the crimes involved were inextricably linked to
the Nazi state itself.30 Indeed, as various scholars such as Professor
William Schabas have rightly observed, the chapeau of Article VI of
the IMT Charter specifically gave the special tribunal competence to
try and punish the persons who committed crimes against peace, war
crimes, and crimes against humanity, while acting “in the interests of
the European Axis countries, whether as individuals or as members
of organizations.”31
A year later, the International Military Tribunal for the Far East
enacted the core elements of the IMT Charter as the basis for
prosecuting Japanese leaders responsible for atrocities committed
during the war.32 These prosecutions were patterned on the same
logic as that for Germany’s trials. They included very few counts of
crimes against humanity in the indictment based on the same
definition created at Nuremberg, albeit with some minor changes.33
28. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of
the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279.
29. Id. 82 U.N.T.S. at 288 (emphasis added).
30. William A. Schabas, State Policy as an Element of International Crimes,
98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 953, 961–62 (2008).
31. Id. at 961.
32. Establishment of an International Military Tribunal for the Far East art. 1,
Jan. 19, 1946, TIAS 1589, 4 Bevans 20.
33. See id. art. 5(c), 4 Bevans at 23 (leaving out religious grounds for
persecution and adding that “[l]eaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices
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The focus again was on devising a workable definition that would
permit the determination and apportionment of the individual
criminal responsibility for the leaders, instigators, and organizers,
among others, who had participated in the formulation or execution
of a common plan or conspiracy to commit the underlying prohibited
acts in the Asian theatre.
The need for a new category of crimes at Nuremberg and Tokyo
resulted from the fact that traditional international law only
prohibited certain acts of war when in conflict with other States, not
atrocities committed by a government against its own citizens. The
latter type of conduct was deemed to be an internal affair of the
concerned State, not the business of other States, mostly because of
the influence of strong nineteenth-century positivist notions of
sovereignty. Because the IMT Charter was the first clear statement of
the law governing crimes against humanity, without the war nexus, it
opened the door to the potential argument that prosecutions at
Nuremberg were based on ex post facto laws. As Professor
deGuzman put it, “linking crimes against humanity to the ostensibly
treaty-based war crimes and crimes against peace provided a shield
against charges that the prosecutions for these crimes violated the
principle of legality or nullum crimen sine lege.”34 There was in fact
contention to that effect, but the argument was roundly rejected by
the Tribunal on the basis that the principle did not apply to that
situation. Similarly, although the IMT determined that “no crime
without law” was a general principle of justice that militated in favor
of trials rather than a limitation on sovereignty, it claimed, perhaps
dubiously given the doctrine’s seemingly settled nature, that there
was not yet universal consensus under customary international law
on the illegality of ex post facto laws.35
participating in the formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to
commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts performed by any
person in execution of such plan”). Very few crimes against humanity charges
were brought against the defendants as an overwhelming majority were for crimes
against peace.
34. deGuzman, supra note 11, at 122.
35. Cf. ANTONIO CASSESE ET AL., THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 354–55 (2002) (“Immediately after World
War II, the nullem crimen sine lege principle could be regarded as a moral maxim
designed to yield to superior exigencies whenever it would have been contrary to
justice not to hold persons accountable for appalling atrocities. The strict legal
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In the end, mostly as a result of the Allied countries’ unease with
the first legal use of the concept of crimes against humanity, many of
the Nuremberg convictions actually emphasized the legally required
linkage between the offense and violations of the laws and customs
of war and crimes against peace. To prove crimes against humanity,
the acts relied on before the outbreak of war must have been in
execution of, or in connection with, any crime within the jurisdiction
of the Tribunal. The IMT declined to declare all the Nazi acts before
1939 crimes against humanity, but after the war had begun, in so far
as the inhumane acts charged in the indictment did not constitute war
crimes, they were all committed in execution of, or in connection
with, the aggressive war, and therefore constituted crimes against
humanity. That said, despite the IMT’s willingness to additionally
convict some of the defendants for crimes against humanity on top of
war crimes and crimes against peace, these limitations contributed to
the restricted development of the case law on this offense, as the
focus of the final judgment was more on interpretation and
application of the other two crimes. This thereby gave rise to greater
uncertainty later on as to the concept’s status in customary
international law, although the 1945 definition was subsequently
formally endorsed by the international community.36
Crimes against humanity, similarly defined as in the Nuremberg
and Tokyo Tribunals, also found its way into Article II(2)(a) of
Allied Control Council Law No. 10.37 Under that law, which
prohibition of ex post facto law had not yet found expression in international law;
at least, it did not appear to comprise a general principle of law generally accepted
by all States.”).
36. See Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the
Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal, G.A. Res. 95(1), at 188, U.N. Doc. A/64/Add. 1
(Dec. 11, 1946) (directing the formulation, for purposes of a codification of
international offenses, of the principles recognized in the IMT Charter and the
Nuremberg Tribunal’s judgments); Special Rapporteur, Report on the Formulation
of Nürnberg Principles, Int’l Law Comm’n, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/22 (Apr. 12, 1950)
(by J. Spiropoulos), reprinted in [1950] 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 181, 191-95,
U.N. Doc A/CN.4/22 (presenting the International Law Commission’s proposed
formulation of said principles).
37. Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes Against Peace and
Against Humanity, Control Council Law No. 10, 20 December 1945, 3 OFFICIAL
GAZETTE CONTROL COUNCIL FOR GERMANY 50 (1946), reprinted in 1 TRIALS OF
WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL
COUNCIL LAW NO. 10 xvi-xix (1949) (defining crimes against humanity as
“[a]trocities and offenses, including but not limited to murder, extermination,
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provided the uniform legal basis for the allies to prosecute war
criminals and other similar offenders in their respective zones of
occupation, the definition of crimes against humanity grew to
encompass additional prohibited acts and also eliminated the war
nexus. These prosecutions later faced criticism for alleged noncompliance with the legality principle. The inconsistent case law
emanating from the judgments for those cases added a layer of
confusion to an already incoherent and contested offense.

B. THE ROAD TO HEAVEN IS PAVED WITH GOOD INTENTIONS:
ELIMINATING THE STATE POLICY REQUIREMENT
IN THE ICTY AND ICTR
Like the IMT Charter, the Statute of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”), which was the next
major attempt to create an ad hoc tribunal since the end of World
War II, does not include an explicit policy requirement in its
definition of crimes against humanity.38 However, the early
jurisprudence of that court adopted the view that such a policy was
an implicit element of crimes against humanity under customary
international law.39 In the seminal first case, Tadic, the ICTY Trial
Chamber found in 1997 that customary international law did require
that crimes against humanity be committed pursuant to a policy but
that the policy was not required to originate from the State.40 This
enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, or other inhumane acts
committed against any civilian population, or persecutions on political, racial or
religious grounds whether or not in violation of the domestic laws of the country
where perpetrated”).
38. See ICTY Statute, supra note 6, art. 5 (“The International Tribunal shall
have the power to prosecute persons responsible for the following crimes when
committed in armed conflict, whether international or internal in character, and
directed against any civilian population: (a) murder; (b) extermination; (c)
enslavement; (d) deportation; (e) imprisonment; (f) torture; (g) rape; (h)
persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds; (i) other inhumane acts.”).
39. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Judgment, ¶ 653 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997), http://www.unhcr.org/cgibin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain?docid=4027812b4 (finding that crimes against
humanity have traditionally been understood to entail “some form of policy to
commit [the] acts” given that they are the result of “a deliberate attempt to target a
civilian population”).
40. See id. ¶¶ 654–55 (holding that customary international law has evolved to
recognize that such policies may be pursued by non-government forces with de
facto control over, or free movement within, a defined territory and that this could
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assessment, which actually had arisen out of a foray into the meaning
of “attack directed against the civilian population,” was emphatically
rejected by the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY in the Kunarac
judgment of 2002. The appeals court held that a review of the status
of the State or organizational policy requirement under customary
international law overwhelmingly supported the conclusion that
neither State action nor a policy of any kind was required to establish
crimes against humanity.41 The judges concluded that the existence
of a plan or policy may prove to be evidentially relevant, but
ultimately they deemed that it was not a required legal ingredient of
the crime.
The opinion in the Kunarac case, which was rendered only about
five years after Tadic, has been cited widely in subsequent cases in
both the ICTY and its sister court, the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”), for this proposition.42 However, this
reliance seems to be attributable more to the clarity of its conclusion
than the strength of the case law cited in support of it. As has been
noted by many prominent scholars, of whom Professors Bassiouni
and Schabas are two examples, a careful review of the sources that
the judges used to support their conclusion in this famous footnote of
international criminal law reveals that the role of the policy
requirement for crimes against humanity rests more on quicksand
than on solid ground.43 At its best, the status of the requirement was
emanate from a governmental, organizational, or group policy).
41. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, Judgment, ¶ 98
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 12, 2002), http://www.unhcr.org/
refworld/docid/3debaafe4.html.
42. See Prosecutor v. Blaškic, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Judgment, ¶ 120 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 29, 2004), http://www.unhcr.org/
refworld/publisher,ICTY,,,4146f0eb4,0.html (citing Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23
& IT-96-23/1-A, Judgment, ¶ 98) (“The Appeals Chamber agrees that a plan or
policy is not a legal element of a crime against humanity, though it may be
evidentially relevant in proving that an attack was directed against a civilian
population and that it was widespread or systematic.”); Prosecutor v. Semanza,
Case No. ICTR-97-20-A, Judgment, ¶ 269 (May 20, 2005), http://www.unhcr.org/
cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain?docid=48abd53e1a (also citing Kunarac, Case
No. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, Judgment, ¶ 98) (“Contrary to the submissions of
the Appellant, the Prosecution did not have to prove the existence of a high-level
policy against the Tutsi: although the existence of a policy or plan may be useful to
establish that the attack was directed against a civilian population and that it was
widespread and systematic, it is not an independent legal element.”).
43. See Schabas, supra note 30, at 959–64 (finding the ICTY’s conclusion as to
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more unclear at the time of the Kunarac decision than was initially
suggested. This is especially so considering that the ICTY
completely ignored opposing authorities, such as the Rome Statute
definition of the crime, which arguably is more indicative of the
views of States and perhaps even reflective of customary
international law.
Despite this acknowledgement, the ICTY expressed some
uncertainty about what role that policy element should play. The trial
court in the Kupreškić case, for example, held that even though
crimes against humanity necessarily implied the existence of a
policy, it was probably more of a useful threshold to be considered
rather than a requirement of crimes against humanity as such.44 It
held that crimes against humanity need not be State-sponsored, but
that they must at least be condoned or tolerated by the State. The
organizational policy element could also be satisfied by an entity or
group that possessed de facto authority over a territory, according to
the Tribunal.45 The Kupreškić chamber then qualified these
statements with the concession that crimes against humanity are
usually committed pursuant to a criminal government policy.46 While
rejecting the argument that crimes against humanity could only be
committed pursuant to State-sponsored policy, the Kupreškić
decision seemed to express uncertainty about exactly what role the
policy requirement should play, or what type of group would be
necessary, to implement that policy. It was a clear signal of judicial
discomfort with the requirement.
A year later, another ICTY Trial Chamber further weakened the
significance of the plan or policy requirement in the Kordic case by
adopting and perhaps even extending the reasoning in Kupreškić. It
determined that crimes against humanity were not required to be
committed pursuant to an explicit policy, but that the existence of a
policy was an important indicative factor to take into account in
the lack of a policy requirement to be a “results-oriented political decision” based
on a “very summary discussion”); Bassiouni, supra note 15, at 24–26.
44. Prosecutor v. Kupreškic, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment, ¶ 552 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 14, 2000), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/
kupreskic/tjug/en/kup-tj000114e.pdf.
45. Id.
46. Id. ¶ 553 (observing that national case law tends to emphasize this aspect of
the offense).
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evaluating whether crimes against humanity had in fact occurred.47
This group of judges arguably went a bit further when they held in
Kordic that it would “not be appropriate” to impose a definite policy
requirement or to adopt a strict view of it for the purposes of
discerning crimes against humanity.48
Following the Kordic trial ruling, the ICTY appeals judges
attempted to resolve the policy requirement debate definitively in the
Kunarac case. In a simple footnote whose relatively short length
belies the moral and legal ambition of its conclusion, the Appeals
Chamber rejected the assertion that a plan or a policy was even a
necessary element to consider in evaluating crimes against humanity
under customary international law.49 In support of this assessment,
47. Prosecutor v. Dario Kordic, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 181–82
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 26, 2001), http://www.unhcr.org/
cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain?docid=41483e9be.
48. Id. ¶ 182. The Appeals Chamber did not have to revisit this point because
both the Prosecution and the Defense did not ultimately contest the policy
requirement, with the ICTY Prosecutor assuming that the matter had been settled
by the Kupreškić appeals ruling. Id.
49. The footnote is as follows:
There has been some debate in the jurisprudence of this Tribunal as to
whether a policy or plan constitutes an element of the definition of crimes
against humanity. The practice reviewed by the Appeals Chamber
overwhelmingly supports the contention that no such requirement exists under
customary international law. See, for instance, Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg
Charter; Nuremberg Judgement, Trial of the Major War Criminals before the
International Military Tribunal, Nüremberg, 14 November 1945 - 1 October
1945, in particular, pp 84, 254, 304 (Streicher) and 318-319 (von Schirach);
Article II(1)(c) of Control Council Law No. 10; In re Ahlbrecht, ILR 16/1949,
396; Ivan Timofeyevich Polyukhovich v The Commonwealth of Australia and
Anor, (1991) 172 CLR 501; Case FC 91/026; Attorney-General v Adolph
Eichmann, District Court of Jerusalem, Criminal Case No. 40/61; Mugesera
et al. v Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, IMM-5946-98, 10 May
2001, Federal Court of Canada, Trial Division; In re Trajkovic, District Court
of Gjilan (Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), P Nr 68/2000, 6 March
2001; Moreno v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), Federal
Court of Canada, Court of Appeal, 1994g 1 F.C. 298, 14 September 1993;
Sivakumar v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), Federal
Court of Canada, Court of Appeal, 1994g 1 F.C. 433, 4 November 1993. See
also Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security
Council Resolution 808 (1993), S/25704, 3 May 1993, paras 47-48; Yearbook
of the International Law Commission (ILC), 1954, vol. II, 150; Report of the
ILC on the work of its 43rd session, 29 April - 19 July 1991, Supplement No
10 (UN Doc No A/46/10), 265-266; its 46th session, 2 May - 22 July 1994,
Supplement No 10 (UN Doc No A/49/10), 75-76; its 47th session, 2 May - 21
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the Tribunal cited ample case law from the national courts of the
Netherlands, Canada, and Yugoslavia, as well as to the Nuremberg
Tribunal, among other sources.50 However, the strength of these
sources in supporting this assertion is open to serious doubt. A
review of the case law cited in the Kunarac footnote, as well as the
authorities that preceded that decision, appears to more reliably
support the conclusion that the role of the policy requirement for
crimes against humanity was never settled prior to that decision.51
Essentially, the judges in Kunarac waved the magic wand in an
attempt to wish away the State or organizational policy requirement,
perhaps because of the normative belief that such an approach was
better for the more effective criminalization of gross human rights
violations. But that effort appears to have been unsuccessful for
various reasons. For instance, in respect to some of the jurisdictions
cited, the appeals judges cited immigration cases that had only
incidentally touched on the meaning of crimes against humanity
instead of the more applicable criminal law authorities.52 Similarly,
July 1995, 47, 49 and 50; its 48th session, 6 May-26 July 1996, Supplement
No 10 (UN Doc No A/51/10), 93 and 95-96. The Appeals Chamber reached
the same conclusion in relation to the crime of genocide (Jelisić Appeal
Judgement, para. 48). Some of the decisions which suggest that a plan or
policy is required in law went, in that respect, clearly beyond the text of the
statute to be applied (see, e.g., Public Prosecutor v Menten, Supreme Court of
the Netherlands, 13 January 1981, reprinted in 75 ILR 331, 362-363). Other
references to a plan or policy which has sometimes been used to support this
additional requirement in fact merely highlight the factual circumstances of
the case at hand, rather than impose an independent constitutive element (see,
e.g., Supreme Court of the British Zone, OGH br. Z., vol. I, 19). Finally,
another decision, which has often been quoted in support of the plan or policy
requirement, has been shown not to constitute an authoritative statement of
customary international law (see In re Altstötter, ILR 14/1947, 278 and 284
and comment thereupon in Ivan Timofeyevich Polyukhovich v The
Commonwealth of Australia and Anor, (1991) 172 CLR 501, pp. 586-587).
Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23/1-A, Judgment, ¶ 98 n.114 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 12, 2002), http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/
docid/3debaafe4.html.
50. Id.
51. See Schabas, supra note 30, at 959-64 (demonstrating that a number of the
authorities cited in the footnote did not support the ICTY’s conclusion, and
pointing to contrary authorities the Tribunal failed to consider, in particular Article
7(2)(a) of the Rome Statute).
52. For example, this is evident from a perusal of the Canadian case law cited,
which ignored relevant Supreme Court of Canada authority. Yet, in fairness, there
is an intersection between immigration and criminal law, especially in the denial of
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as already observed, they ignored the significant Rome Statute
contextual element requiring State or organizational policy and other
contrary authorities. Nevertheless, Kunarac has been extensively
cited by the ICTY in support of the proposition that neither a plan
nor a policy of any kind is required for a crime against humanity
under customary international law. It immediately became the
darling of international prosecutors for lifting a heavy evidentiary
burden off their shoulders.
The decision has also been cited with approval by the sister
ICTR.53 Like the ICTY, the Statute of the ICTR makes no explicit
reference to a plan or policy requirement for crimes against
humanity.54 And, although its definition of the crime against
humanity offense differs from that of the ICTY in requiring that
attacks be committed on certain discriminatory grounds, given their
shared appeals chamber under Article 12(2), which was established
asylum to suspects of international crimes through the exclusion clauses of the UN
Refugee Convention. For the first thorough book-length analysis of the intersection
of refugee and criminal law in national and international case law, see JOSEPH
RIKHOF, THE CRIMINAL REFUGEE: THE TREATMENT OF ASYLUM SEEKERS WITH A
CRIMINAL BACKGROUND IN INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC LAW (2012).
53. See Prosecutor v. Martic, Case No. IT-95-11-T, Judgment, ¶ 43 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 12, 2007), http://www.unhcr.org/cgibin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain?docid=469de5652 (citing Kunarac, Case No. IT-9623 & IT-96-23/1-A, Judgment, ¶ 58) (“The crime ‘need not have been planned or
supported by some form of policy’”); Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR-9720-A, Judgment, ¶ 269 (May 20, 2005), http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/
refworld/rwmain?docid=48abd53e1a (citing Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23 & IT-9623/1-A, Judgment, ¶ 98) (“Contrary to the submissions of the Appellant, the
Prosecution did not have to prove the existence of a high-level policy against the
Tutsi: although the existence of a policy or plan may be useful to establish that the
attack was directed against a civilian population and that it was widespread and
systematic, it is not an independent legal element.”); Prosecutor v. Bradanin, Case
No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 137 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Sept. 1, 2004), http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain?docid=
4146fd744 (citing Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 98–
101) (“There is no requirement under customary international law that the acts of
the accused need to be supported by any form of policy or plan.”).
54. See ICTR Statute, supra note 6, art. 3 (“The International Tribunal for
Rwanda shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible for the following
crimes when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any
civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds:
a) Murder; b) Extermination; c) Enslavement; d) Deportation; e) Imprisonment;
f) Torture; g) Rape; h) Persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds; i)
Other inhumane acts.”).
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to help ensure a coherent body of law, the ICTR jurisprudence on
point has largely paralleled the ICTY case law in rejecting an
implicit plan or explicit policy element as a requirement for crimes
against humanity. In Prosecutor v. Semanza,55 for example, the
tribunal relied on the Kunarac case for its “clarification” that the
existence of a plan or policy may be evidentially relevant in a
determination of whether crimes against humanity have occurred, but
that it is not a legal requirement.56 Subsequent cases, such as
Sylvestre Gacumbitsi v. The Prosecutor,57 have reiterated this
position, again invoking Kunarac as sound authority for the
proposition that a policy element is not required for a finding that a
crime against humanity had taken place.
In sum, while both the ICTY and the ICTR jurisprudence have
gradually rejected and ultimately abandoned the need for a State or
organizational plan or policy element for crimes against humanity,
and in the process of doing so influenced the direction of some
national case law on this particular issue, it seems apparent from the
above review, as well as that of other scholars, that the decisions of
both tribunals are based on legally weak or at least legally
questionable foundations.

III. THE UNCERTAIN CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW STATUS OF THE STATE
OR ORGANIZATIONAL POLICY REQUIREMENT
A. PROSECUTIONS OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
IN NATIONAL COURTS
Customary international law is considered a primary source of
international law.58 In a classical sense, custom consists of the
general practices of States that are carried out because of a sense of
55. Prosecutor v. Laurent Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T, Judgment (May
15, 2003), http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/publisher,ICTR,,,48abd5a30,0.html.
56. Id. ¶ 329.
57. Prosecutor v. Gacumbtsi, Case No. ICTR-2001-64-T, Judgment, ¶ 299
(June 17, 2004), http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/publisher,ICTR,,,48abd5220,
0.html (citing Semanza as citing Kunarac).
58. See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59
Stat. 1055, 1060 (mandating that the Court apply “international custom, as
evidence of a general practice accepted as law”).
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legal obligation (opinio juris). As a general rule, evidence of
customary international law can be found both in the consistency of
State practice and in how widespread and dense that State practice is.
In the context of international criminal law, this State practice seems
most evident in the case law of national courts, which, like the ICTY
and the ICTR jurisprudence, reveals the difficulty courts face in
coming to a solid determination of the role of the policy requirement
of crimes against humanity under customary international law.
The French trial of Klaus Barbie provides a clear example of this
ambiguity.59 Barbie was a notorious Gestapo leader who was
stationed in Lyon during World War II. He was captured in Bolivia
in 1983 and extradited to France to face charges of crimes against
humanity that were based on the same definition of the offense used
at Nuremberg.60 The French Court of Cassation defined crimes
against humanity in Barbie as inhumane acts committed “in the name
of a State practicing a hegemonic political ideology.”61 The Court
further stated that these crimes must be committed “against the
adversaries of this [State] policy, whatever the form of their
opposition.”62 In this way, the tribunal suggested that a State policy
or governmental involvement is, at a minimum, an element to take
into account in evaluating whether crimes against humanity had
occurred if indeed it was not a formal legal requirement.
The Canadian case of Regina v. Finta of 1994 also offers useful
insight into the status of crimes against humanity in customary
international law, although the ICTY Appeals Chamber chose not to
mention it in Kunarac, presumably because it was unfavorable to its
position. Imre Finta was in charge of a Nazi investigation unit in
Hungary in which thousands of Jews were confined and deported to

59. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] crim., Dec.
20, 1985, Bull. crim., 1985, No. 407, obs. Le Gunehec (Fr.).
60. See Guyora Binder, Representing Nazism: Advocacy and Identity at the
Trial of Klaus Barbie, 98 YALE L.J. 1321, 1324–30 (1989) (summarizing Barbie’s
life story and explaining how, due to technical reasons, at the time of his trial he
could only be prosecuted in France for crimes against humanity).
61. Leila Sadat Wexler, The Interpretation of the Nuremberg Principles by the
French Court of Cassation: From Touvier to Barbie and Back Again, 32 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 289, 342 (1994).
62. Id. (stating the additional elements of perpetration in a systematic fashion
against persons on account of their racial or religious group).
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concentration camps.63 After the war, he fled to Canada, where his
identity was eventually discovered, and he was charged with war
crimes as well as crimes against humanity.64 In addressing the
elements of the latter crime, as in the Barbie case, the Supreme Court
of Canada placed heavy emphasis on the importance of a State policy
for crimes against humanity.65 Although the Criminal Code did not
specify that a State plan or policy was an element of crimes against
humanity for the offense to be prosecutable under Canadian law, the
judges relied on expert testimony by a noted international criminal
law scholar, Professor Bassiouni, for their finding that a State action
or policy was a prerequisite to finding that crimes against humanity
had occurred.66
A noteworthy exception to the extensive reliance on the policy
element of crimes against humanity is In re Ahlbrecht.67 Notable in
the Dutch Special Criminal Court’s decision is the absence of any
reference to a plan or policy element at all. In contrast, the Dutch
opinion focused on the widespread or systematic nature of the attacks
in determining whether they should be characterized as crimes
against humanity. According to the Court, rather than the defining
character being the involvement of the State, it is the magnitude and
scope of crimes that raise them to the level of concern to the
international community as a whole.68
In a nutshell, according to these judicial interpretations, the
primary distinction between this class of international compared to
domestic crimes was whether the offenses were isolated acts of
violence or whether the attacks were widespread or systematic or
massive in scale such that they “shocked the conscience of
mankind.”69 It follows that while the role of a State plan or policy is
63. R. v. Finta, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 701, 725 (Can.).
64. Id. at 791–92.
65. Id. at 814 (distinguishing crimes against humanity from common criminal
offenses in that the elements of the former are “undertaken in pursuance of a policy
of discrimination or persecution of an identifiable group or race”).
66. Id. at 823 (finding therefore that the trial judge properly instructed the jury
to consider whether the defendant knew he was “assisting in a policy of
persecution”).
67. In re Member Ahlbrecht (Special Court of Cassation 1947), summarized in
14 ANN. DIG. & REP. OF PUB. INT’L L. CASES 196 (1951) (Neth.).
68. Id.
69. Id.
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generally acknowledged in some domestic prosecutions of crimes
against humanity, its treatment varies widely among national courts.
It is sometimes viewed as a requirement, as the Barbie and Finta
cases in France and Canada suggested, and sometimes ignored
completely, as in the Ahlbrecht case in the Netherlands.

B. THE SLOW EVOLUTION
OF A CLEAR CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY DEFINITION
AT THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION
It was at the International Law Commission (“ILC”), between
1950 and 1996, that most of the legal work was done trying to sort
out the essence of crimes against humanity.70 While not without
some serious ambiguity on a range of controversial issues relating to
the justification for the offense, and some steps forward and
sometimes backwards on aspects like the conflict nexus, the ILC’s
definitions of crimes against humanity and attempts to isolate the
inner core that make them proper subjects of international instead of
domestic jurisdiction eventually converged to the view that the
hallmarks of such offenses lie in their widespread or systematic
nature.71 By their very nature, such crimes are frequently undertaken
on the instigation, at the behest and support of or toleration of State
authorities implementing some type of deliberate policy or plan
while being targeted, wholly or partially, at the civilian population.72
Nevertheless, in the final analysis, the public or private nature of the
organization—that is, whether it is a State-like or non-State-like
entity that is behind the perpetration of the crimes—was less material
to the prerequisite condition for a finding that crimes against
humanity have in fact occurred. This seems evident from a review of
the ILC’s admittedly progressive codification effort.
70. For a thorough overview of the historical pedigree of crimes against
humanity, including the progress and evolution of the ILC’s work, see the
background section of Mohamed Elewa Badar, From the Nuremberg Charter to
the Rome Statute: Defining the Elements of Crimes Against Humanity, 5 SAN
DIEGO INT’L L.J. 73, 144 (2004). An excellent book-length treatment is also
available: M.C. BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: HISTORICAL EVOLUTION
AND CONTEMPORARY APPLICATION 42 (2011).
71. See Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly
on the Work of Its Forty-Sixth Session, [1997] II(2) Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N, UN
Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1994/Add.l (Part 2), art. 21, para. 14.
72. Id.
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In its 1954 Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security
of Mankind, the ILC offered a definition of crimes against humanity
describing them as “inhuman acts by the authorities of a State or by
private individuals against any civilian population, such as murder,
or extermination, or enslavement, or deportation, or persecutions on
political, racial, religious or cultural grounds, when such acts are
committed in execution of or in connexion with other offences
defined in this article.”73 Although this formulation was rightly
criticized by some scholars at the time for introducing some
problematic new aspects, as Mohamed Badar has explained,74 on its
face and as the ILC commentary helpfully clarified, this conception
envisaged that crimes against humanity could be committed by any
State authorities or even private individuals.75
In 1991, the ILC considered yet another definition of this offense.
It obliquely emphasized that the ultimate mischief of these crimes is
that they are committed on a systematic or massive scale.76 While
noting that the mass nature of the crimes often necessarily implies a
plurality of victims, plurality of perpetrators as well as the plurality
of the means employed, Special Rapporteur Doudou Thiam was only
willing to go so far as to say that this suggests that crimes against
humanity would more likely take place in the context of individuals
taking advantage of a State or organizational apparatus to implement
their objective.77 Importantly, in offering examples of circumstances
of apartheid (wherein the State itself is the entity behind the
violations) and “major financial groups” (that finance genocidaires
and mercenaries for example), he did not consider the character of
the group behind the attacks as determinative of the question whether

73. See Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly,
Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, U.N. Doc.
A/2691; U.N. GAOR, 9th Sess., Supp. No. 9, ch. 3, art. 2, para. 11, (1954).
74. Badar, supra note 70, at 85.
75. Id. at 84 n.53.
76. See Special Rapporteur, Seventh Report on the Draft Code of Crimes
Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, ¶¶ 60–61, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/419 and
Add.I (1989) (by Doudou Thiam) [hereinafter Seventh Report on the Draft Code]
(asking and answering the question whether an act needs to affect a mass of people
to constitute a crime against humanity); see also Report of the International Law
Commission to the General Assembly on the Work of Its Forty-Third Session, art.
21, U.N. Doc. A/46/10; U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (1991).
77. Seventh Report on the Draft Code, supra note 76, ¶ 61.
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crimes against humanity may be found to have taken place.78 What
mattered in either scenario was that they had the capability to
commit the offenses. Thiam was even comfortable with the notion
that a single massive act may give rise to crimes against humanity
provided that it takes place in the context of a larger coherent
system.79 But again, his concern was not to delineate that only State
organs can commit such crimes; to the contrary, he implied that
while they are more likely to be the ones behind it, there is nothing to
preclude others from being originators of the crime.
When it adopted a third definition of the offense in 1996, the ILC
conception of crimes against humanity had matured and contained
the core elements that later laid the initial basis for discussions of an
ICC definition. This time, the Draft Code characterized crimes
against humanity as the commission of certain prohibited acts, such
as murder, extermination, torture or enslavement, “when committed
in a systematic manner or on a large scale and instigated or directed
by a Government or by any organization or group.”80 The
accompanying commentary noted that two predicate conditions had
thus been introduced for an act to be deemed a crime against
humanity.81 Firstly, the act must have been committed systematically
or on a large scale. Systematicity implied that the inhumane acts
must have occurred pursuant to a preconceived plan or policy leading
to the continuous commission of the crimes—a factor that was
included to exclude random acts that were not part of a broader
policy or plan.82 The large scale character of the acts expressed the
idea that they must also be directed against a “multiplicity of
victims,”83 thereby eliminating the inhumane acts committed by a
lone perpetrator against a sole victim but that are not part of a
broader criminal system.
As to the second condition, which mandated that the act be
78. Id. ¶ 61.
79. Id. ¶ 62.
80. See Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, art.
18, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.532; U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess. (July 8, 1996) (emphasis
added).
81. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its FortyEighth Session, ch. 2, art. 18, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. A/51/10; U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess.,
Supp. No. 10 (1996).
82. Id.
83. Id. art. 18, ¶ 4.
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instigated by a government or by an organization or group, the ILC
commentary affirmed what should already be plain from the ordinary
text above: that such action may be authored by any type of group—
again, irrespective of its qualification as a public or private entity.
This requirement was introduced so that crimes against humanity
would exclude the situation wherein an individual commits an
inhumane act solely on his own initiative.84 The instigation or
direction of either a government or an organization or a group, which
“may or may not be affiliated with a government”, is what “gives the
act its great dimension and makes it a crime against humanity
imputable to private persons or agents of a State.”85

IV. THE STATE OR ORGANIZATIONAL POLICY
REQUIREMENT IN THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT CASE LAW
A. JUDICIAL DISSENSION
IN THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
Unlike the definition of crimes against humanity in the ICTY and
ICTR Statutes and the ILC formulations for its Draft Code, the
definition of the offense in the Rome Statute does include an explicit
policy requirement for the purposes of qualification as crimes against
humanity. Article 7 specifies that a crime against humanity refers to
a list of underlying prohibited acts such as murder, extermination,
torture, rape, apartheid, deportation or forcible transfer of a
population, among others, “when committed as part of a widespread
or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with
knowledge of the attack.” This part of the provision endorses the
mass crime prevention rationale of crimes against humanity that is
evident from prior ILC iterations. Article 7(2)(a) then captures the
so-called contextual element, explicitly clarifying that an “‘attack
directed against any civilian population’ means a course of conduct
involving the multiple commission of acts referred to in paragraph 1
against any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a
State or organizational policy to commit such attack.”86 This part of
84. Id. art. 18, ¶ 5.
85. See id. art. 18, ¶ 5 (emphasis added).
86. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 7, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90, 93-94 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
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the clause again underscores that the social harm that gives crimes
against humanity its essence are the massive nature and scale of the
crimes, but as a qualifier, limits them in the last part of the sentence
to those of such offenses carried out using State or organizational
means. This endorses the criminal State conception of this crime that
is rooted in the IMT Charter, which tried to punish the criminal
mischief of the entire Third Reich.
The above textual review of Article 7 of the Rome Statute reveals
the schizophrenia of the definition that at once nods to both the mass
crime and the predatory State rationales for the offense. It is
therefore not surprising that this would create space for interpretive
schism among the judges once the Court received concrete cases. In
both the decision authorizing an investigation into the situation in
Kenya,87 and the subsequent decisions issuing joint summonses for
the appearances of William Ruto, Francis Muthaura,88 and four other
Kenyans, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber found that it had jurisdiction
over the violence that occurred following the announcement of the
contested results of the East African nation’s presidential elections of
December 27, 2007, based on its conclusion that the crimes appeared
to have been committed pursuant to an organizational policy.
According to the majority’s interpretation, the “State or
organizational policy” required by Article 7(2)(a) can be
implemented by any organization that is capable of committing
widespread or systematic attacks against a civilian population.89
87. Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Case No. ICC-01/09, Decision
Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation
into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya (Mar. 31, 2010), http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc854562.pdf (containing a seminal ruling regarding the
scope of crimes against humanity) [hereinafter Kenya Authorization Decision].
88. Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Case No. ICC-01/09, Decision on the
Prosecutor’s Application for Summons to Appear for William Samoei Ruto, Henry
Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang (Mar. 8, 2011), http://www.icccpi.int/NR/exeres/E0EB838E-59AA-4F92-9B6D-E66DD194050E.htm
(summonsing six Kenyans to appear before the ICC for their alleged crimes against
humanity, with the suspects including high-ranking civil servants and distinguished
politicians) [hereinafter Ruto Decision]; Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Case
No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for Summonses to
Appear for Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed
Hussein Ali (Mar. 8, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1037052.pdf.
89. Ruto Decision, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11, ¶ 20 (implying that if a
systematic attack occurs, that very fact should be evidence of the existence of a
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Whether the group is capable of committing such an attack would be
examined with certain non-required criteria in mind, and the
understanding that the policy need not be formal or, for that matter,
emanate from the State or entities belonging to it.90 In a way, this
view tends to assert the primacy of the mass crime rationale for the
textual definition of the offense.
In all three cases, Judge Hans-Peter Kaul offered compelling
dissenting opinions directed at reaffirming the criminal State
justification for crimes against humanity. In contrast to the majority,
the respected German judge would require the group to have certain
State-like characteristics, a position that seems consistent with the
IMT experience after World War II. In his view, the crucial
contextual elements would include whether there was a collectivity,
sharing in a common purpose, operating over a prolonged time
period, with a recognized hierarchy or command structure including
a policy-making level, the capacity to impose the policy and to
sanction its members that fall out of line, and, crucially, the means to
attack civilians on a wide scale.91
Underlying these competing views over how to correctly interpret
Article 7(2)(a) of the Rome Statute are contrasting broad and narrow
normative visions of the role of international criminal law and
differing concerns over the implications of possibly expanding the
jurisdiction of the ICC beyond the intent of the framers of the Rome

State or organizational policy).
90. Id. ¶ 24–25 (examining the specific ground in which the Ruto-led group
was held to be capable of committing a widespread systematic attack on a civilian
population living in the Rift Valley).
91. See Kenya Authorization Decision, supra note 87, ¶ 51 (dissenting
opinion):
even though the constitutive elements of statehood need not be established
those “organizations” should partake of some characteristics of a State. Those
characteristics eventually turn the private “organization” into an entity which
may act like a State or has quasi-State abilities. These characteristics could
involve the following: (a) a collectivity of persons; (b) which was established
and acts for a common purpose; (c) over a prolonged period of time; (d)
which is under responsible command or adopted a certain degree of
hierarchical structure, including, as a minimum, some kind of policy level; (e)
with the capacity to impose the policy on its members and to sanction them;
and (f) which has the capacity and means available to attack any civilian
population on a large scale.
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Statute.92 As Professor Claus Kress has argued, the majority
approach in the Kenya decision can be seen as favoring a teleological
understanding of crimes against humanity that views the goal of
international criminal law as promoting basic human values, and a
broader or more expansive understanding of the State or
organizational policy requirement as an ideal method of
accomplishing that goal.93 This approach tends to view customary
international law as evolving to allow the ICC’s jurisdiction to cover
an expanding category of mass crimes that perhaps could eventually
include even purely private organizations.94
On the other hand, Judge Kaul’s more traditional approach could
be seen as focusing the ICC on the narrower path of preventing
impunity for truly international crimes sponsored by the State or its
organs. His conception of crimes against humanity would seemingly
keep the jurisdictional reach of international criminal law within the
narrow confines of a set of strictly delineated core crimes and factual
circumstances that are not necessarily punishable within the domestic
legal system in which they occur, and would additionally ensure that
the Court does not infringe on State sovereignty by overstepping the
boundaries of its jurisdiction.95 This perspective perhaps reflects a
realist view to the effect that the challenge of fighting impunity
necessarily implies a reasonable burden sharing between States and
92. See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: INTRODUCTION, ANALYSIS AND INTEGRATED
TEXT 151–52 (2005):
Article 7 does not bring a new development to crimes against humanity,
namely its applicability to non-state actors. If that were the case, the mafia,
for example, could be charged with such crimes before the ICC, and that is
clearly neither the letter nor the spirit of Article 7.
93. See Kress, supra note 16, at 861.
94. See Kenya Authorization Decision, supra note 87, ¶ 90:
[A]s others have convincingly put forward, a distinction should be drawn on
whether a group has the capability to perform acts which infringe on basic
human values: the associative element, and its inherently aggravating effect,
could eventually be satisfied by “purely” private criminal organizations, thus
not finding sufficient reasons for distinguishing the gravity of patterns of
conduct directed by “territorial” entities or by private groups, given the
latter’s acquired capacity to infringe basic human values.”
95. See Kress, supra note 16, at 861 (“The contextual requirement of crimes
against humanity reflects the wish of states that these (and other) rather heavy
restrictions on their sovereignty only apply in particular instances of human rights
violations.”)
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international criminal tribunals possessing limited jurisdiction and
resources like the ICC. Under this view, the contours of the core
crimes would presumably be clearly defined, interpreted narrowly,
and applied precisely to situations so obviously within the
parameters of the Court’s jurisdiction as to be uncontroversial.
In his dissent, Judge Kaul explained that his understanding of the
State or organizational policy requirement would require that there
be an organization for proof of the contextual element of crimes
against humanity—and not just any organization, but crucially one
possessing State-like qualities.96 In the subsequent Ruto decision,
Kaul clarified this and the other criteria he had set forth by carefully
reviewing the material relied on by the majority in evaluating the
Kenyan post-election violence.97 He concluded that the evidence as a
whole failed to establish the existence of an organization. He
reasoned that it seemed hard to substantiate the claim that the groups
responsible for the attacks had a hierarchical structure. This lack of
structure meant that the requirement of a responsible command was
therefore lacking.98 Also, these were groups organized on an ad hoc
basis for a specific purpose and were temporary instead of permanent
organizations.99
In the final analysis, according to Judge Kaul, although the attacks
were seemingly planned and organized, the evidence that the
Prosecution proffered did not reliably demonstrate that they were
part of an organizational policy as defined by Article 7(2)(a).100 The
dissent also expressed serious concerns about the implications of a
possibly indefinite expansion of the ICC’s jurisdiction, including a
potentially unmanageable caseload, an infringement on the State
96. Kenya Authorization Decision, supra note 87, ¶¶ 51, 66–67 (dissenting
opinion) (rejecting the majority’s threshold question of whether a group is able to
act in a way that infringes on fundamental human values).
97. Ruto Decision, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11, ¶¶ 48–50 (dissenting opinion)
(opining, for example, that an ethnically based assembly of perpetrators engaged in
the planning and coordination of brutality in itself does not equate a State-like
organization).
98. Id. ¶ 46 (coordinating activities taking place at a horizontal level cannot
substitute for a vertical hierarchical structure).
99. Id. ¶¶ 12, 47 (concluding that the creation of the Network was to assist
political leaders in their plight for power during the presidential elections).
100. Id. ¶ 50 (containing an expressis verbis legal requirement of a State or
organizational policy).
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sovereignty of those countries that more legitimately have
jurisdiction, and the possible erosion of the Court’s legitimacy that
these issues could entail.101
The problem is that, though hard to prove definitively, both the
majority and Judge Kaul’s interpretation of the contextual element of
crimes against humanity in Article 7(2)(a) may be correct from the
standpoint of the text and perhaps even the legislative intent of the
Rome Statute. We have already seen above that the text of Article 7
endorses at least two differing understanding of the core thrust of the
crime, presumably to appease States on different sides of the issue
during the negotiations. Nonetheless, the unofficial reports of
academics involved in negotiating Article 7 offer helpful but
sometimes conflicting information in terms of which of these views
ought to prevail. Some, like Professor Robinson, suggest that the
provision was the result of several pressures that had to be worked
through to achieve political compromise between the countries that
worried that crimes against humanity could be used as a backdoor to
intrude into national sovereignty and those that sought a workable
definition that reflected positive developments in the law.102
On the other hand, others like Professor Bassiouni, the chair of the
drafting committee of the Rome Statute negotiations, have weighed
in on this particular debate only to assert that the organizational
policy requirement was intended to apply only to organs of the State
such as the police, military, intelligence, or other similar
organizational units.103 In his view, Article 7(2)(a) will therefore not
101. Id. ¶¶ 4–7 (expanding the number of cases would not only increase
scepticism as to the interests served by the court but would also blur the lines of
what crimes actually constitute a threat to humanity).
102. See Robinson, The Elements of Crimes Against Humanity, supra note 1, at
57:
The definition of crimes against humanity in the Rome Statute was shaped by
at least three different negotiating pressures. First, many states were
concerned that the law of crimes against humanity might be used to intrude on
national sovereignty. These states therefore pressed for a more cautious, or
even restrictive, approach to crimes against humanity, with high thresholds
and narrow definitions. Second, in contrast to the first pressure, many other
states were committed to a broad, workable definition reflecting the positive
developments recognized in various authorities. Third, because of the broad
potential applicability of the ICC Statute definition, there was considerable
pressure for a high level for precision and clarity.
103. Bassiouni, supra note 15, at 24 (arguing further that those, including the
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extend to other organizations that are purely non-State actors.104 For
this reason, in his view, the Kenya Authorization majority decision is
a serious cause for concern because it distorts the intention behind
having the State or organizational policy requirement as a
jurisdictional trigger by broadening its ambit further than was
initially envisaged.105
The reports of these scholars involved in the ICC treaty
negotiations processes are all helpful. Yet a cursory examination of
the plenary records of the final July 1998 Rome Statute negotiations
regarding crimes against humanity appears to suggest that the bulk of
the States focused more on the magnitude and scale of the crime as
the core justification of the internationality of the offense as opposed
to the organizational nature and character of the entity behind its
commission. This point is implicit in the plain text of the provision
itself, which adopts the widespread or systematic criteria. There is
also evidence that the State or organizational policy requirements
were embedded as limiting criteria to help define the appropriate
circumstances under which to trigger international involvement. This
was one way to distinguish attacks of a widespread or systematic
nature, rather than acts carried out by some random persons or bands
of criminals acting on their own initiative for their own purely selfish
motives.
The trouble is that, as is usually the case with treaty negotiations,
many delegates did not actually appear to address the specific State
or organizational policy requirement. On the other hand, there were
three delegates that expressed strong objections to the prospective
inclusion of the requirement in the Rome Statute. Jamaica’s delegate
was unhappy that the crimes against humanity definition confined
the concept to attacks directed against civilians in furtherance of a
State or organizational policy.106 Congo’s delegate sounded more
Pre-Trial Chamber in the Kenya cases, who have advocated a broadened definition
of crimes against humanity to encompass non-State actors would effectively gut
the essence that converts crimes against humanity from a domestic to an
international crime).
104. Id.
105. Bassiouni, supra note 15, at 208.
106. See United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Rome, 15 June – 1 7 July 1998,
Official Records, Summary Records of the Plenary Meetings and of the Meetings
of the Committee of the Whole, 328, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/13 (Vol. II), June 15-
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blunt. To him, the inclusion of the element “constituted an
unacceptable threshold that in no way reflected contemporary
realities or international law.”107 He did not elaborate, but keeping in
mind the types of non-State actor conflicts that we see in that region
of Africa today, it is not far-fetched to speculate that the
“contemporary realities” to which he referred were those of modern
warfare in which more conflicts are of an intra-state rather than
inter-state nature and feature rebel groups and other non-State actors
as key perpetrators.
Be that as it may, it was the Sri Lankan delegate, Ambassador
Palihakkara, who appeared to be the most consistent and outspoken
and most on point for this particular issue. Foreshadowing the debate
that the Court was to be mired in many years later in the Kenya
Situation, he kept insisting that the crimes against humanity draft
definition be made clear that the State or organizational policy
requirement was “also intended to cover the policy of nongovernmental entities.”108 His statement, perhaps motivated by his
home country’s experience with the Tamil Tiger rebels, and those of
the Congolese and Jamaican delegates, while reflecting an obvious
minority of the States present, are still significant for what they said.
Equally importantly, his understanding did not draw fire from any of
the other States. It would be too much to claim that the silence by the
other countries constituted endorsement of the Sri Lankan,
Congolese, and Jamaican positions, since it is possible that some
delegates might not even have had strong views on the issue. That
said, there seems to be a measure of acquiescence in the
circumstances though his position was also not adopted. In any
event, the three delegates’ statements, at a minimum, prove that, for
the few States that turned their minds to the issue, the contention that
the State or organizational requirement could not have been intended
to cover the activities of private groups or organizations seems to
now be in some doubt.
However, as can be seen by the strident debate between the
majority of the Pre-Trial Chamber and the dissenting judge in the
17 July, 1998. The delegate was later elected to serve as a judge at the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, where he is currently
in the Appeals Chamber.
107. See id. at 344–45.
108. Id. at 287–88.
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Kenya Authorization decision, the required characteristics of the
States or organizations outside of the formal State structure that are
capable of developing and implementing policies to attack civilians
remain contentious among the judges, despite the relative specificity
of the Rome Statute definition and the position of some of the State
negotiators unearthed above.109 The crucial issue turns on whether
the policy requirement encompasses not only the policies of States,
which may be adopted at the highest levels or by regional or even
local organs, but also those of any organizations and, if so, whether
they may also include non-State entities that are capable of infringing
on basic human values by adopting and implementing a policy to
commit widespread attacks against a civilian population.
The Basic Human Values Test that the majority propounded
focuses less on the nature of the group and more on the harm and the
capabilities of the group engaging in the proscribed conduct. It
implicitly assumes that the existence of a State, State-like
organization, or another type of organized entity would suffice to
trigger crimes against humanity. This conclusion, from a purposive
perspective of wanting to extend the reach of the ICC to cover any
organized non-State actors, seems reasonable even if in practice it
may pose other types of new challenges. The benefit is that reading
the organization requirement liberally might be more realistic in a
non-Western European setting. This is important given that, in
certain parts of the world such as Africa where all of the Court’s
current caseload is from, the State may be so weak that it is incapable
of asserting effective control over the territory and in some instances
may even be on the verge of collapse. In such settings, informally
organized armed groups or rebels may have already played a role in
undermining the State or could come together at the last minute to
fill the vacuum left by the State and, in so doing, act for a common
109. See WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT:
COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE 152 (2010):
The reference to “State or organizational plan or policy” should probably be
construed broadly enough to encompass entities that act like States, even if
they are not formally recognized as such. But an interpretation of the word
“organizational” by which it refers to any group of individuals, brought
together for whatever purpose, is an absurdity. In a literal sense, an
organization could include a social club, a charitable organization, a
motorcycle gang, an organized crimes syndicate, and a terrorist cell. This is
obviously not what Article 7(2) (a) contemplates.
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nefarious purpose.
To fill the gap, these private actors could decide to carry out
widespread or systematic attacks on the local civilian population,
sometimes though not necessarily on purely ethnic or other such
discriminatory grounds. This raises some concern whether the debate
between the majority and dissenting judges on how to properly
classify the actor as a State or a State-like entity before fulfilling the
threshold for crimes against humanity is merited and, if so, whether
it is or should be deemed a generally applicable standard or assessed
on a situation-specific basis. Indeed, considering the proliferation of
small arms and light weapons in many modern armed conflicts, it is
possible to envision many situations where private entities or
individuals who have no connection with the State or a governmental
authority would decide and possess the capacity to carry out mass
attacks against civilians. These could rise to such a level of disquiet
for other States as to constitute a crime against humanity and even a
grave threat to regional or international peace and security.
The majority’s interpretation of the organizational policy
requirement, in the absence of definitive legislative history showing
the actual intention of the drafters, therefore seems defensible,
contrary to Judge Kaul’s suggestion. Indeed, a reasonably strong
argument can be made that what the Pre-Trial Chamber majority did
was nothing more than flesh out and apply a vague word or phrase in
a treaty provision to the specific circumstances arising from the
Kenya Situation wherein private militia with less strong links to the
State seemed to have been part of the organized campaign of postelection violence. This interpreter function is the type of role that we
expect from international judges, including those at the ICC, who
States often entrust with the responsibility of applying the broad text
of a multilateral treaty to specific cases in specific situations against
specific individuals. If this position is correct, it seems arguable that
what is going on at the Court is merely part of the natural and
organic process of the development of statutory provisions and their
purposive interpretation and application to concrete situations and
cases.
Of course, it is also possible to view the majority position
differently. Judge Kaul, who clearly endorses the criminal State
thesis of crimes against humanity, intimates that the majority adopted

418

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[28:2

a progressive and broad interpretation of the crimes against humanity
offense by shifting the goal posts beyond States or State-like entities
in a way that permits the ICC to expand its jurisdiction infinitely to
cover any massive or heart-rending human rights violations.110 Such
expansion, which perhaps is driven by the substantiality of the
crimes committed, may reflect the moral outrage that we naturally
feel—the kind of push that compels many international criminal
lawyers to want to ensure that someone pays for the heinous crimes
committed in a given situation. If such an argument is correct, then it
can be continued that no matter how well intentioned, an interpretive
technique that extends the Court’s subject matter reach in respect to
crimes against humanity comes with some danger. It would either be
seen as acceptable and therefore a good change to the law or be
deemed unacceptable and thus open to contestation. If the latter, the
question might arise whether that judicial position might not generate
pushback from States that could undermine the current and future
direction of the permanent international penal court.
Why? The issue is that a perceived judicial widening of the scope
of crimes against humanity might be viewed by some States Parties,
who subscribe to the predatory State justification of the offense, as a
violation of the carefully crafted compromise that Article 7(2)(a) was
predicated upon. Considering the large number of States Parties to
the Court, at writing numbering 121, it may even plausibly be said
that the current ICC definition of the crime is more reflective of
customary international law.111 Still, Article 10 of the Rome Statute
does clarify that the permanent Court’s definitions should not be
interpreted as limiting or prejudicing in any way existing or
developing rules of international law.112 Any derogation from that
standard, considering that States had the option to adopt an ICTY–
ICTR inspired definition of the same offense eliminating the policy
requirement, but chose not do so, would presumably require some
110. Kenya Authorization Decision, supra note 87, ¶¶ 10, 44, 55, 67 (dissenting
opinion) (providing justification for upholding a high threshold for international
crimes, so as not to confuse serious crimes against humanity with other crimes).
111. deGuzman, supra note 11, at 126 (noting that, due to the sharp divergences
among States, the Rome Statute itself does not purport to be a codification of a
customary international law definition of crimes against humanity).
112. Id. at 126 (observing that, as more and more States use the ICC definition
of crimes against humanity, it is possible that it could one day be seen as indicative
of customary international law).
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explanation. This is all the more so given that the ad hoc tribunal
case law reading out the State-organizational policy requirement for
crimes against humanity also purported to be applying customary
international law. On this logic, it can be suggested that any judicial
interpretation of a crime that is not strictly construed, as pro–human
rights as it might otherwise be, would carry several troubling
implications for the cooperation with and perception of the ICC in
the international community. This is especially so given the edict in
Article 22(2) of the Rome Statute explicitly mandating that ICC
crimes be not only strictly interpreted, but that they should also not
be extended by any form of analogy.
In addition to these points, two related observations seem
warranted. First, as Judge Kaul obliquely warned in his dissent to the
Kenya Authorization decision, removing what the negotiating
countries agreed to in good faith arguably infringes on the principles
of State consent and sovereignty by interfering with the competence
of legal systems that more appropriately have jurisdiction over
crimes that have occurred within their own territory.113 Proof of the
Rome Statute preference for national action to combat international
crimes is amply confirmed by the limited set of core crimes included
in the statute and the endorsement of the principle of
complementarity—as opposed to that of primacy, which obtains in
the ad hoc tribunals—as the cornerstone upon which the entire ICC
system was founded.114
Second, like other international criminal tribunals, in the absence
of independent enforcement mechanisms, the ICC is not only
founded on State cooperation but is also extremely dependent upon
it.115 A key implication of Judge Kaul’s argument was that having a
looser conception of State or organizational policy widens the
boundaries of crimes against humanity in such a way that it would
likely require the Court to be involved in infinitely more situations
than a narrower interpretation would. In this view, the expectations
of victims that the international community will intervene to render
113. See Kenya Authorization Decision, supra note 87, ¶ 10 (dissenting opinion)
(stating that the limited resources of the court must be taken into account when
determining the extent to which jurisdiction reaches).
114. See Rome Statute supra note 86, art. 1 (“[The Court] shall be
complementary to national criminal jurisdictions.”).
115. See id. arts. 98–111.
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justice on their behalf would be heightened. But if victims’ hopes are
raised and dashed, because the ICC cannot realistically investigate or
prosecute in every possible crime base within its jurisdiction, there
would be even greater pressure on the Court to justify why it is
choosing to get involved in some situations but not others. This could
lead to arbitrary situation and case selection, on the part of the
prosecutor, which might in turn leave the institution vulnerable to the
perception that it is not capable of rendering justice for all, thereby
hurting its legitimacy.
In any event, despite the apparent specificity of the requirements
of crimes against humanity in Article 7 of the Rome Statute, there
has been some debate surrounding its meaning even in the ICC
jurisprudence. A brief look at other cases demonstrates this. On
September 30, 2008, the Pre-Trial Chamber issued its confirmation
of the charges in Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu
Ngudjolo Chui.116 In that case, the chamber determined that the
contextual element of Article 7(2)(a):
ensures that the attack, even if carried out over a large geographical area
or directed against a large number of victims, must still be thoroughly
organized and follow a regular pattern. It must also be conducted in
furtherance of a common policy involving public or private resources.
Such a policy may be made either by groups of persons who govern a
specific territory or by any organization with the capability to commit a
widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population. The policy
need not be explicitly defined by the organizational group. Indeed, an
attack which is planned, directed organized — as opposed to spontaneous
or isolated acts of violence — will satisfy this criterion.117

As in the Ahlbrecht case, when discussing the type of attack, the
judges focused on whether the crimes against civilians were
sufficiently widespread or systematic to constitute crimes against
humanity. They also established the policy threshold to be low, and
the type and level of organization required somewhat minimal. By
allowing any type of de facto policy to satisfy the contextual element
of crimes against humanity, regardless of whether it is “explicitly
defined,”118 and by bringing within its ambit any group or
116. Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Judgement,
¶ 396 (Sept. 30, 2008), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc571253.pdf.
117. Id. (emphasis added).
118. Id. (adopting the threshold for what constitutes a policy simply as the attack
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organization, whether public or private, the Chui decision linked the
State or organizational policy element with the oft-discussed
requirement that the attacks be widespread or systematic, rather than
simply spontaneous or isolated incidents. This point lines up with the
concerns of the ILC experts over the past few decades as well as
those of many ICC negotiators of this crime. Under this judicially
endorsed approach, the widespread and systematic concepts play a
screening role to demarcate or isolate the type of violence that should
attract the interest, condemnation, and action of the international
community. This approach also seems to comport with the ICTY
reasoning in the Tadic case.119
In a subsequent ICC decision, another Pre-Trial Chamber adopted
the same type of logic. Citing to the Chui decision, the Court held in
its confirmation of the charges against Jean-Pierre Gomba that the
mandate that crimes against humanity be committed pursuant to a
State or organizational policy only requires that the offenses follow a
regular pattern.120 Much like the foregoing case, and those from the
ICTY post-Kunarac, the policy can be formulated by a “group of
persons who govern a specific territory or by any organization with
the capacity to commit a widespread and systematic attack against a
civilian population.”121

B. THE MEANING OF “STATE” AND “STATE POLICY”
Understanding what would constitute a State or organizational
policy under Article 7(2)(a) seemingly requires an understanding of
what constitutes a “State” and a “State policy” under the Rome
Statute. The ICC treaty does not define either of these terms. Article
31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides the
must be something more than spontaneous, isolated, or random acts of violence,
based mostly from endorsement of the views taken on other occasions by the ICC
Pre-Trial Chambers).
119. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Judgment, ¶ 653 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997), http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/
vtx/refworld/rwmain?docid=4027812b4 (emphasizing that no formal policy is
required but instead can be deduced from notable acts even if they only occur on a
widespread or systematic basis).
120. Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08,
Decision on the Confirmation of the Charges, ¶ 81 (June 15, 2009).
121. Id. (emphasis added) (distinguishing that the attacks need only be
widespread or systematic, not both).
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rules governing the interpretation of a treaty and states that a treaty
must be interpreted in good faith, in light of its object and purpose.122
In addition to the ordinary text of the treaty, subsequent agreements
and State practice in application of the treaty may be taken into
account to understand its text.123 Also, the ordinary language of the
treaty may be superseded by a special meaning given to its text, if it
can be established that this was the intent of the drafters.124
The ordinary meaning of a state found in standard dictionary
definitions denotes a politically organized group of people with a
permanent population occupying a specific territory.125 However,
although this term was taken as somewhat obvious in the ICC’s
Kenya decisions, there is a measure of ambiguity in some of the
important words in Article 7(2)(a) that harkens back to other debates
about what types of entity may constitute a State in public
international law. The assumption that their requirements have been
met in the government entities that have been the subject of
international prosecution has arguably contributed to the vagueness
of the use of the term in international criminal law.
Whatever the case, the generally accepted legal elements of
statehood indicate a more technical definition than the ordinary
dictionary meaning suggested here. It would basically require a
permanent population, having control over a defined territory, the
existence of a government, and the capacity to engage in formal
relations with other States126—all criteria that are now said to be part
122. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.
123. Id. art. 31(3)(a)–(b).
124. Id. art. 31(4).
125. See State, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/state (last visited Sept. 22, 2012) (defining a state as “a politically
organized body of people usually occupying a definite territory”).
126. Although the formal requirements of statehood were classically stated in
Article 1 of the 1933 Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (the
Montevideo Convention), which initially applied only to its sixteen parties in the
Western hemisphere, the criteria it laid down are deemed to be universally
applicable today because of their crystallization into general customary
international law. As to how these norms have been incorporated in U.S. practice,
see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 201 (1965):
Under international law, a state is an entity that has a defined territory and a
permanent population, under the control of its own government, and that
engages in, or has the capacity to engage in, formal relations with other such
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of customary international law.
Even if these minimal public international law criteria are met, of
particular uncertainty in the criminal law context of crimes against
humanity is how to recognize the existence of a formal State policy
and, in turn, who would have the authority of implementing that
policy. As Judge Kaul explains it in his dissent to the Kenya
decision:
acts of the central government and of any other organ at the regional or
local level may be imputable to a State; however, considerations of
attribution do not answer the question of who can establish a State
policy. . . . [C]onsidering the specific circumstances of the case, a policy
may also be adopted by an organ which, albeit at the regional level, such
as the highest official or regional government in a province, has the means
to establish a policy within its sphere of action.127

This entails a fairly broad approach to the definition of a State
policy by creating potential legal responsibility on the part of central
governments for the actions of subsidiary regional or local
governments. That, in and of itself, is not too solid a critique since it
is settled in international law that the conduct of an organ of the
State, or a territorial unit of a State, irrespective of whether it carries
entities.
a. Definition of state. While the definition in this section is generally
accepted, each of its elements may present significant problems in unusual
situations. In the absence of judicial or other means for authoritative and
consistent determination, issues of statehood have been resolved by the
practice of states reflecting political expediency as much as logical
consistency. The definition in this section is well-established in international
law; it is nearly identical to that in Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention on
the Rights and Duties of States, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097, T.S. No. 881, 165
L.N.T.S. 19.
b. Defined territory. An entity may satisfy the territorial requirement for
statehood even if its boundaries have not been finally settled, if one or more
of its boundaries are disputed, or if some of its territory is claimed by another
state. An entity does not necessarily cease to be a state even if all of its
territory has been occupied by a foreign power or if it has otherwise lost
control of its territory temporarily.
The Montevideo Convention similarly provides in Article 1 that “The state as a
person of international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a
permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to
enter into relations with the other states.” Montevideo Convention on Rights and
Duties of States art. 1, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097, T.S. No. 881.
127. Kenya Authorization Decision, supra note 87, ¶ 43 (dissenting opinion).
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out legislative, judicial, executive, or other functions, is attributable
to it. It does, however, highlight an important distinction made
between the actions of private actors from those of State actors or
organs pursuing an official policy. As a general rule, whereas State
actors or organs may author a policy and can consequently be held
responsible for it, the conduct of private actors is not generally
attributable to a State. The uncontroversial exception would be if the
private entity or actor is engaging in the wrongful conduct on the
instructions of the State or under its influence, direction, or control.
In Tadic, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY got the first
opportunity to adapt and apply a general principle of State
responsibility in the context of determinations of individual criminal
responsibility. The judges confirmed that private action pursued in
coordination with a State should be attributed to the State itself in
order to be punishable.128 In that case, the Tribunal held that the
crucial factor in determining whether paramilitary activities could be
imputed to the State is whether the State is effectively in control of
the group.129 This control can be demonstrated by evidence that the
State not only equipped and financed the group, but also by whether
it was instrumental in planning and coordinating the attacks.
In other words, in circumstances where the State exercises overall
control, the conduct of auxiliary bodies can be attributed to the
State—even if they are private persons or entities formally separate
and apart from it. It need not have ordered the attacks directly.
Rather, the key element in Tadic appears to be, having regard to the
factual circumstances in each case, whether there is overall State
control over the policy of the group. If there is, then the group policy
can rightly be considered to be the de facto policy of the State itself.
The cases at the ICC seemed to mesh the requirements for a State
policy with the requirements for an organizational policy, because of
the belief that the latter would include organs of the State. Discussing
128. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, ¶ 144 (July 15,
1999), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acjug/en/tad-aj990715e.pdf:
[P]rivate individuals acting within the framework of, or in connection with,
armed forces, or in collusion with State authorities may be regarded as de
facto State organs. In these cases it follows that the acts of such individuals
are attributed to the State, as far as State responsibility is concerned, and may
also generate individual criminal responsibility.
129. Id. ¶ 131.
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the requirements of an organizational policy, in Prosecutor v.
Germain Katanga, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber held that an attack
that is part of an organizational policy must be organized and follow
a consistent pattern.130 In addition, the attack must be designed to
promote a common policy that involves either public or private
resources. Such a policy may be made either by groups of persons
who govern a specific territory or, more crucially, by any
organization with the capability to commit a widespread or
systematic attack against a civilian population. On this view, the vital
distinction between a State and organizational policy is whether
either public or private resources are marshaled or used to implement
it and the capability of the group in carrying it out. However, the
reference to both public and private resources within the discussion
of an organizational policy could also be read as affirming that a
group can be characterized as an organization for the purposes of
Article 7(2)(a) with or without the involvement of the State.
Part of the ambiguity surrounding what constitutes a State or
organizational policy seems to stem from the uncertainty over
whether the discussion of its requirements is implicitly in reference
to the level of connection that the organization must have with the
State, or whether it surrounds the distinction between a State policy
and an organizational policy, with States and organizations
construed as entirely separate entities under the statute. Further
complicating a coherent understanding of what amounts to a State
policy under Rome Statute Article 7(2)(a) is the fact that the ICC has
specified that State inaction amounting to willful blindness can be
interpreted as effectively promoting a policy to commit crimes
against humanity. The ICC’s Elements of Crimes specifies that a
“policy to commit such an attack” requires that the State or
organization actively promote or encourage such an attack against a
civilian population.”131 In a footnote, this is further clarified by the
statement that:
[a] policy which has a civilian population as the object of the attack would
130. See Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07,
Judgement, ¶ 396 (Sept. 30, 2008), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/
doc571253.pdf.
131. Int’l Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes, ICC-PIDS-LT-03-002/11, art. 7,
¶ 3 (2011), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/336923D8-A6AD40EC-AD7B-45BF9DE73D56/0/ElementsOfCrimesEng.pdf.
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be implemented by State or organizational action. Such a policy may, in
exceptional circumstances, be implemented by a deliberate failure to take
action, which is consciously aimed at encouraging such attack. The
existence of such a policy cannot be inferred solely from the absence of
governmental or organizational action.132

The failure of a State to take measures to stop crimes against
humanity can be an important factor in evaluating whether a State or
organizational policy exists. The rationale for this approach is most
likely that the State is or would presumptively be aware of the
existence of the prohibited acts amounting to crimes against
humanity due to their organized, widespread, or systematic scale.
This awareness of the perpetration of crimes makes the State
complicit only if the intent behind the inaction is to further the
attack, not if the State is unable to prevent it.
Deliberate inaction could be a particularly relevant factor when
evaluating the existence of crimes against humanity, especially if the
State and the organization’s interests are interlinked. However,
conclusively establishing that inaction is deliberate could be
problematic. Something more than a failure to act is required. The
implication is that the State or organization would somehow have a
measure of knowledge and be connected to the entity as a way of
encouraging the impugned conduct. All this adds to the uncertainty
about the scope and limits of the ICC formulation of crimes against
humanity.
There is credible evidence in the status of customary international
law leading up to the Rome Statute supporting the assertion that a
group can pursue an organizational policy with no connection to the
State whatsoever. In addition to the Kunarac case, and the
questionable national case law cited within it, the ILC’s Draft Code
anticipated that crimes against humanity can be pursued by purely
private groups. Article 18 defined crimes against humanity as
perpetration of enumerated acts constituting crimes against humanity
“in a systematic manner or on a large scale and instigated or directed
by a Government or any organization or group.”
As discussed earlier, the commentary to Article 18 explicitly
clarified that two conditions must be fulfilled for a prohibited act to
132. Id. art. 7, ¶ 3 n.6.
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be deemed a crime against humanity. Firstly, it must be committed
systematically (i.e., pursuant to a preconceived plan or policy) or,
alternatively, on a large scale (meaning that the acts are directed
against a multiplicity of victims). Secondly, it must be instigated or
directed either by a government or “any organization or group.”
There was no requirement that the organization be tied to the State
whatsoever or that it should possess any specific (including State or
State-like) characteristics. The ILC further explained that this
condition was intended to exclude isolated or random violent acts
carried out by a lone individual based on his own criminal plan
toward his own criminal objective. In the result, it is the actual
instigation or direction from a government or any organization or
group, whether it is affiliated or unaffiliated to a government that
makes the act an international crime imputable to private persons or
agents of a State.133
This suggests that, to the ILC, as for other scholars such as
Professor Luban, it is the collective nature of the actors and their
victims that is the defining feature of crimes against humanity.134
That the Draft Code was adopted in 1996, three years after the
Statute of the ICTY, which contained no explicit textual policy
requirement but developed one jurisprudentially only to subsequently
amend it, underscores the general inconsistency of the international
bodies on the State or organizational policy requirement. This,
therefore, necessitates a closer examination of the meaning of an
organization in customary international law.

133. See Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind,
supra note 80, art. 18, ¶ 5:
The second condition requires that the act was “instigated or directed by a
Government or by any organization or group.” The necessary instigation or
direction may come from a Government or from an organization or a group.
This alternative is intended to exclude the situation in which an individual
commits an inhumane act while acting on his own initiative pursuant to his
own criminal plan in the absence of any encouragement or direction from
either a Government or a group or organization. This type of isolated criminal
conduct on the part of a single individual would not constitute a crime against
humanity.
134. David Luban, A Theory of Crimes Against Humanity, 29 YALE L.J. 85, 90
(2004) (arguing that this represents “politics gone cancerous”).
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C. THE MEANING OF “ORGANIZATION”
AND “ORGANIZATIONAL POLICY”
The concept of an “organization” and an “organizational policy” is
clearly much broader than either a “State” or a “State policy.” Used
in a loose way, a “State” could be considered an “organization,” and
an “organization,” in the sense of its composite organs, could
certainly be part of a “State.” This raises questions about the intent of
the drafters of the Rome Statute in including both categories in
Article 7(2)(a) and whether they should have offered answers to
some of the questions that arose later by offering specific definitions
for those terms. Since they did not, perhaps because it did not occur
to the drafters or they wanted to leave those types of details to the
Court’s judges, resolving some of the difficulties merits a brief
review of the ordinary meaning of an organization and an
organizational policy.
Standard dictionary definitions of the term “organization” usually
refer to an administrative or functional structure;135 a group of people
sharing a particular purpose, “as in a business, a government
department, a charity, etc.,”136 or a group of people who work
together in a structured way for a shared purpose.137 This definition is
suggestive of a modest and loose, rather than rigid and ordinary,
standard of what an organization is. The crucial elements of the term
appear to involve some type of group acting in pursuit of a common
purpose and exhibiting some form of structure or hierarchy.
Examining these elements in the context of the object and purpose
of the Rome Statute, which according to the preamble includes
ending impunity for international crimes while at the same time
respecting State sovereignty and allowing the jurisdiction of national
courts to have primacy, signifies a fairly broad scope to the term that
perhaps better accords with the majority in the Kenya Authorization

135. See Organization, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/organization (last visited Oct. 2, 2012).
136. See Organization, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/
view/Entry/ 132452?redirectedFrom=organization#eid (last visited Oct. 1, 2012)
[hereinafter OED Organization Definition].
137. See
Organization,
CAMBRIDGE
DICTIONARIES
ONLINE,
http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/british/organization_1?q=organization
(last visited Oct. 2, 2012).
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decision.138 The fact that the 1998 draft of the Rome Statute did not
include any type of explicit policy requirement in its definition of
crimes against humanity also falls in line with this reasoning.139
Largely relying on tribunal decisions that have endorsed the
Kunarac tribunal’s rejection of the requirement of a policy or plan
for crimes against humanity, the trend in the ICC prior to the Kenya
decisions had been to focus on whether the organization had the
capacity to commit a widespread and systematic attack on a civilian
population. In Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Gomba, for example, the
Court found that an organizational policy can be pursued by any
groups “who govern a specific territory or by any organization with
the capability to commit a widespread and systematic attack against a
civilian population.”140 In the same vein, in Prosecutor v. Katanga,
the judges held that an organizational policy may be pursued by “any
group with the capability to commit a widespread or systematic
attack against a civilian population.” These decisions seem to rely on
the three generally accepted qualities of any organization,
specifically that it consists of (1) a group (2) with a defined structure
and (3) shared purpose.
This reliance on the extensive international penal tribunal case law
that has rejected the requirement that the organization have State-like
qualities is understandable in light of the consistency of the ICTY
and ICTR judgments following the Kunarac case. However, as I
have argued earlier on in this article, and others have also done
elsewhere, considering the ultimately shaky pillars upon which the
Kunarac judgment rested, whether it reflects an international
consensus as to the normative vision of crimes against humanity
under customary international law remains open to question.
Nevertheless, even if the concept is kept within the limitation that
the organization involves a State-like structure, much like Professor
Bassiouni has suggested in several of his publications, similar or new
138. See Rome Statute, supra note 86, pmbl.
139. See Preparatory Comm. on the Establishment of an Int’l Criminal Court,
Rep. from the U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court (Addendum) art. 5, June 15–17,
1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/2/Add.1 (Apr. 14, 1998).
140. Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08,
Decision on the Confirmation of the Charges, ¶ 81 (June 15, 2009) (stating that
these types of widespread or systematic attacks exhibit a regular pattern).
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questions would still arise. Whether a tribe, for example, is a
sufficiently State-like structure to constitute an organization within
the meaning of Article 7(2)(a) is open to debate. Considering that a
tribe is more akin to a group and does not necessarily have the legal
capacity to enter into formal relations with other States, and that it
may or may not be organized into a “recognizable government,” it
would at first blush seem that a tribe would potentially not have
some of the legally recognized characteristics of a State as defined
by, for example, the Restatement on Foreign Relations Law.
However, many tribes would almost certainly fall within the ordinary
customary international law understanding of an organization, body,
or group with State-like characteristics, as they can be entities with a
permanent population, occupying a specific territory, and having
their own internal government.
Similarly, once denuded of its Euro-centric underpinnings, it is
apparent that tribes or ethnic groupings in Africa or other parts of the
world usually have the ability to enter into relations with other tribes
or groups that may or may not also occupy a specific geographic area
or have control over it. Thus, a case can be made that, at least certain
types of tribes, bear a sufficient degree of “organization” to
constitute State-like entities, even if they do not meet the classical
customary international law definition of a State. Regardless of how
State-like or un-State-like a tribe is, the potential that you have a
group that will be capable of committing atrocities against civilians
without international accountability still remains.
This difficulty is apparent in the Muthaura decision. The
majority’s conclusion that the evidence provided a reasonable basis
to believe that the ethnicity-based group Mungiki constituted an
organization within the meaning of Article 7(2)(a) was based on a
finding that the group operated within a large and complex
hierarchical structure featuring various levels of command, and that
obedience within the group was achieved through strict disciplinary
measures. In addition, the majority found that the group employed a
trained militant wing that it used to carry out violent operations and
to sustain power over many societal activities in and around
Nairobi.141 This was sufficient to satisfy the criteria the judges had
141. See Prosecutor v. Muthaura, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision on the
Prosecutor’s Application for Summonses to Appear ¶ 22 (Mar. 8, 2011),
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provided in the Kenya Authorization decision that the group exist
within an established hierarchy under a responsible command,
possess the means to carry out a widespread or systematic attack on a
civilian population, have a criminal objective as a primary purpose,
and articulate either implicitly or explicitly an intention to attack a
civilian population, amongst other things.142 On this approach, the
group should qualify as sufficiently organized to fall within the
parameters of crimes against humanity, as understood on its plain
meaning in Article 7(2) of the Rome Statute.
This argument would appear consistent with the views of other
scholars, like Professor Robinson, who has offered a compelling
theoretical defense for the majority decision by advocating for a
“modest standard” for “organization.” In his view, “[a]s long as there
is some organized entity directing, instigating or encouraging crimes,
then we are no longer confronted with mere spontaneous ‘crime
waves’ and unconnected acts of individual wrongdoing.”143 That is to
say, excluding random acts, it does not so much matter which type of
public or even private organization is carrying out the crimes in
question. A similar position has been advanced by Professor Leila
Sadat, a leading scholar, regarding the concomitant policy
http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/exeres/D99DEB2B-E48B-4942-8546-515B792F2297
.htm. The Court relied on evidence that:
the Mungiki (i) control and provide social services such as electricity, water
and sanitation; (ii) administer criminal justice through local chairmen who act
as judges in their communities; and (iii) control the transport sector and other
business activities, where they provide informal employment for members.
The material shows that to support such activities, the Mungiki collect
informal taxes in the areas under their control. In light of the foregoing, the
Chamber is of the opinion that the material submitted provides reasonable
grounds to believe that the Mungiki qualify as an organization within the
meaning and for the purposes of article 7(2) (a) of the Statute.
142. See Kenya Authorization Decision, supra note 87, ¶ 93. The considerations
that the majority specified in their entirety were whether:
(i) the group is under a responsible command, or has an established hierarchy;
(ii) whether the group possesses, in fact, the means to carry out a widespread
or systematic attack against a civilian population; (iii) whether the group
exercises control over part of the territory of a State; (iv) whether the group
has criminal activities against the civilian population as a primary purpose;
(v) whether the group articulates, explicitly or implicitly, an intention to
attack a civilian population; (vi) whether the group is part of a larger group,
which fulfills some or all of the above mentioned criteria.
143. See Robinson, Essence of Crimes Against Humanity Raised at ICC, supra
note 7.
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requirement, that “[w]hile the policy element is clearly part of the
ICC Statute, overemphasis on its application will result in limiting
the scope and applicability of [crimes against humanity] so severely
that it becomes, like genocide, a crime so difficult to prove that its
overall utility becomes severely limited.”144
It follows that, if readers accept Robinson’s and Sadat’s proposals,
as I do, we would confer greater interpretative flexibility to the ICC
judges by lowering the threshold of what constitutes an organization
as far down as possible, in the same way that we would lower the
threshold required to find that a policy is in place. In this way, we
make large-scale and systematic crimes that take place in a wide
variety of situations deserving of international investigation and
prosecution if the concerned State fails to act or is unwilling or
unable to do so. I endorse this view, especially keeping in mind the
remarks about the crucial role of this residual category of
international crime and the importance of extending prosecutions to
non-State actors for human security reasons in a jus post bellum–
conscious world. Even Professor Bassiouni, who seemingly opposes
the extension of Article 7(2)(a) to non-State actors, appears to accept,
in his most recent work, that the Rome Statute could expand crimes
against humanity to explicitly cover non-State actors, presumably
even if they are not possessing the traditional State or State-like
organizational characteristics, through “its future jurisprudence.”145
The irony of the debate at the ICC is that, even using Judge Kaul’s
preferred criteria, it could be argued that the Mungiki constitutes an
organization for the purposes of Article 7. This would ordinarily be
the case, but it is particularly so in the circumstances of the low
reasonable basis to believe evidentiary threshold applicable at the
authorization to investigate stage.146 In his dissenting opinion, Judge
Kaul argued that organization for the purposes of Article 7(2)(a)
must include a collectivity of persons, acting with a common
144. See Sadat, supra note 4, at 90.
145. BASSIOUNI, supra note 70, at 42.
146. See Rome Statute, supra note 86, art. 15(3):
If the Prosecutor concludes that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with
an investigation, he or she shall submit to the Pre-Trial Chamber a request
for authorization of an investigation, together with any supporting material
collected. Victims may make representations to the Pre-Trial Chamber, in
accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
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purpose, and having a responsible command or hierarchical structure
that includes some kind of policy-making level. The capacity to
impose the policy on its members and to sanction was also necessary,
as was the organization’s ability to attack a civilian population on a
large scale and its existence for a prolonged time period.147
The Mungiki seems to be a collectivity of persons, acting with a
common purpose. Considering that the evidence suggested that it
was a large criminal organization with the capacity to impose taxes
in a geographic area within its control, as well as the power to
sanction its members, it would seem, contrary to Judge Kaul’s
conclusion in the Kenya Authorization decision, that some type of
hierarchy can be presumed. Of course, this determination would
partly depend on exactly how the Mungiki is able to sanction its
members—evidence that will likely come out during the course of
the trials in the Kenya cases. While definitive conclusions cannot be
drawn until then, threats of or actual use of force, in a militia like
that, would appear integral to the ability to sanction. These modes of
discipline should not be discarded lightly, especially if the fear of
extreme violence or perhaps even loss of life to self or family
members living in a particular community is sufficient to bring
members back in line.
A hierarchy signifies a body of persons ranked in a specific
order.148 But if the Mungiki’s ability to sanction stems from a shared
power structure in which each member has equal authority, then
there is a potential argument that the organization is not
appropriately characterized as existing within a hierarchy, or even
under a responsible command. However, if the ability to sanction
involves a more complex chain of command, as the majority opinion
seems to have found, or even if it stems from one central authority
figure that is in effective control of the entire group, then the
evidence would more strongly support the conclusion that the
Mungiki are properly classified as an organization, according to
147. See Kenya Authorization Decision, supra note 87, ¶ 51 (dissenting opinion)
(emphasizing that only non-State actors with a State-like nature can satisfy the
requirement of an organization within the meaning of Article 7(2)(a)).
148. See OED Organization Definition, supra note 136 (defining a hierarchy as
a “body of persons or things ranked in grades, orders, or classes, one above
another; spec. in Natural Science and Logic, a system or series of terms of
successive rank (as classes, orders, genera, species, etc.), used in classification”).
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Judge Kaul’s own criteria.
Similarly, the ability to sanction need not be formal to imply a
relatively complex hierarchy, which in turn would suggest that the
group has been in existence for at least a period of time and most
likely has the capacity to attack a civilian population on a large scale.
There is certainly general information confirming the long-term
existence of ethnicity-based militia in Kenya, such as the Mungiki,
and certainly in other African countries. This most famously includes
the Interhamwe, who played a crucial role in the 1994 genocide in
Rwanda as well. Indeed, even the ability to pursue a policy seems to
imply the existence of a basic form of organization, and any
organized collective group action can potentially be characterized as
constituting a policy, as the Tadic case made clear.149 Both sets of
criteria seem somewhat redundant, then, perhaps showing that
attempting to provide greater detail in the definition of an
organization can also obscure its meaning.
The point is that all these terms seem highly malleable, leaving the
status of what constitutes an organization capable of committing
crimes against humanity under the Rome Statute unclear. This lack
of clarity, combined with the sheer number of situations that could
fall within ICC jurisdiction, in effect gives the prosecutor and the
judges the not-so-easy task of evaluating, on a case-by-case basis, the
features that make a collectivity of persons an organizational group
for the purposes of committing crimes against humanity.
It also suggests that there has to be a measure of discretion in
evaluating whether particular entities are appropriately characterized
as organizations or the degree to which their activities need to be
organized, and the extent to which their attacks should be widespread
or systematic to fall within the scope of crimes against humanity. In
any such assessments, the focus of the analysis should more
appropriately hone in on the wrongful conduct that has caused
international social harm or alarm and whether the members of the
group have the means to commit a widespread and systematic attack
149. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Judgment, ¶ 653 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997), http://www.unhcr.org/cgibin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain?docid=4027812b4 (holding that “[i]f the acts occur
on a widespread or systematic basis that demonstrates a policy to commit those
acts, whether formalized or not”).
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on civilians, rather than on the proper appellation to be given to the
organization in the sense of how State-like or un-State-like its
qualities are. In an interesting way, it reminds one of the feckless
distinction (from a human-life-protection point of view) between
international and non-international armed conflict in international
humanitarian law, where the evolution of the two separate regimes
justified, in the former not the latter, the prosecution of those who
committed grave breaches. It took international judicial intervention,
in the ICTY, to render that distinction nugatory.
Similarly, we should not be wedded to the concept of which type
of State or non-State organization is committing massive crimes
against innocent civilians; rather, we should try to broaden the justice
net and bring such entities to international prosecutions to send the
symbolic message that their depredations are totally unacceptable not
just to one society, but to all of human society.

V. CONCLUSION
Considering the ambiguity surrounding the definition of crimes
against humanity in customary international law leading up to the
Rome Conference, and the incorporation of a version of the offense
retaining a State or organizational policy requirement as codified in
Article 7, the most effective reformulation of the concept would be
through an amendment to the Rome Statute.
There are several advantages to this solution, only a few of which
can be highlighted here. First, it allows for a more principled
approach to the development of international criminal law. The
difficulty judges have had in the ICTR, ICTY, and ICC with
reconciling inconsistent and unsupported assessments of the
requirements of crimes against humanity under customary
international law and their particular instruments demonstrate the
necessity of a clearer international stance on the issue. While there
will always be some degree of ambiguity in the language used, and
therefore the felt need for a certain level of judicial discretion in
defining the exact contours of crimes against humanity (and other
international crimes for that matter), the recent decisions of the ICC
in response to the post-election violence in Kenya reveals deep
confusion in the Rome Statute definition. This uncertainty, which
was a product of the lack of normative consensus on what exactly is
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the essential rationale and outer boundary of the offense, has led to
inconsistent analysis among judges, scholars, and practitioners.
Most recently, this inconsistency has resulted in the creation of
fuzzy criteria for evaluating the requirements of an organization
within the meaning of Article 7 of the Rome Statute by both the
majority and dissenting opinions in the Kenya Authorization and
summonses decisions. Even though they reach opposite conclusions
regarding the exact character of an organization, both the majority
and the dissent have offered indefinite criteria that seem open to
wide interpretation. A close examination of both sets of criteria leads
to a linguistic quagmire that does little to help resolve the underlying
question of what exactly ought to be the primary justification for
crimes against humanity.
In some respects, stepping back to frame a bigger picture, the
confusion and ambiguity may be viewed as the natural evolutionary
process of customary international law, in which the judiciary’s role
is to expand or restrict the definition or role of crimes against
humanity according to shifting objectives of the Court and its States
Parties. However, the persistence of the controversy over the State or
organizational policy requirement since Nuremberg, and the lack of
conclusion that influential and seemingly definitive assessments like
the Kunarac judgment provided, demonstrate that any judicial stance
on the issue will be open to further attack. To avoid potentially
unproductive and endless judicial and academic debates on the issue,
the Rome Statute needs to be amended. This will be particularly
helpful in the early years of the ICC by providing a solid position on
the proper role and function of the permanent tribunal in what seems
to be the beginning stage of the era of international criminal justice.
Second, change through an amendment to the Rome Statute
provides for a more coherent and more consistent development of the
law. In so doing, the advantages and potential repercussions of a
policy shift can be thoroughly examined by parties both for and
against the State or organizational policy requirement. Although this
examination of the implications of the alleged expansion of the
ICC’s jurisdiction has been occurring among the dissenting voices in
the judiciary and academia, an amendment to the Rome Statute
allows for a more democratic, more participatory, more deliberative,
and ultimately more principled legal process involving the States
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Parties that have the ultimate responsibility to give effect to them
through national prosecutions.
Third, it will also recognize the kind of separation of powers
implicit in national and international law between judges, as
interpreters of the law, and States, as legislators of the body of law
that they apply. A settled agreement on the meaning of the State or
organizational policy requirement will be especially helpful in
situations such as that which occurred following the post-election
violence in Kenya, where the evidence appears to, at least initially,
fail to clearly demonstrate either the existence or absence of a State
policy to commit crimes against humanity. That decision
demonstrated that establishing an evidentiary link between State
actors and a policy on the part of the State will often be difficult,
problematic, and in some permutations that might arise in the future,
perhaps even impossible. The police force, for example, was
implicated in the Kenyan post-election violence. However, whether
the police were acting at the instigation or under the direction of the
State or its organs, or whether they were acting independently as
hired guns for politicians acting for private purposes, or even worse
in cahoots with militia organizations for ethnic reasons, seems to be
unsettled.
An amendment to the Rome Statute would help provide guidance
in future situations such as Kenya’s by requiring an international
consensus on whether a policy should be required for a finding that
crimes against humanity had occurred and, if so and more
importantly, what type of policy should be required and from whom.
Additionally, the controversy occasioned by the willingness of the
majority in the Kenya Authorization decision to interpret broadly the
threshold of crimes against humanity to possibly encompass purely
private and loosely constituted and amorphous groups underscores
the need for a clear statutory definition of an “organization” and
“organizational policy.”150 In other words, to enhance clarity, it may
be necessary to assign specific meanings to those terms to address
the predicate question of the nature, type, and characteristics of the
entity that will be deemed capable of adopting and implementing a
policy that could then be said to have crossed the borderline into the
prohibited criminal conduct against all of humanity.
150. Jalloh, supra note 16.
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Of course, from the emerging jus post bellum perspective, which
takes the imposition of punishment and retribution for leaders who
oversee violence during conflict as a desirable goal to advance
human rights and a just and sustainable peace, an interpretation of
the Rome Statute that widens the scope of crimes against humanity
to consciously include non-State actors is the most appropriate
course for the ICC to take in the future. There is support for that in
the ad hoc tribunal jurisprudence, which, with the best of intentions,
effectively sought but unfortunately failed to do away with the State
policy requirement before the permanent court was created.
Still, it is submitted that a change in the policy of the ICC on this
scale would be contentious if undertaken by judges alone, as opposed
to by legislators (i.e., States Parties), considering the principles of
free consent and the multilateral treaty basis of the Rome Statute and
international law more generally. As the concept is sufficiently broad
to potentially apply to a nearly unlimited quantity of crimes, an
international normative and legislative consensus on both the
purpose of crimes against humanity in the Court’s jurisprudence, and
the most appropriate method of accomplishing its prohibitions,
would arguably provide a more legally and more politically
acceptable solution to the controversy. Yet it can already be deduced
from the definitions of crimes against humanity that date back to
Nuremberg that the international community condemns widespread
or systematic human rights violations against unarmed civilians. The
prospects for the extension of the concept therefore seem to be in
favor of those wanting for the regime to explicitly cover non-State
actors instead of those who oppose such a change.
While there are strong arguments both for and against an
expansion in the ICC’s jurisdiction over other modern gross violators
of human rights, such as terrorist groups, the issue is unlikely to be
effectively addressed by the judiciary. This is because the lack of
consensus on the meaning of terrorism would likely make any
judicial approach to bringing single massive terroristic events into
the crimes against humanity fold highly controversial. But, in a
security-conscious world, we may appropriately engage the policy
debate whether crimes against humanity should be extended to apply
to groups or other actors whose modus operandi may today place
them at the borderline or the periphery of the offense without
crossing the threshold into its prohibitions because of a strict
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interpretation of the State or organizational policy requirement.
Thus, for instance, we may discuss the propriety of broadening the
boundary of crimes against humanity to include single but
devastating incidents such as the August 1998 Nairobi bombings in
Kenya; the New York City bombings of September 11, 2001, in the
United States; the March 2004 Madrid bombings in Spain; the July
2005 London bombings in England; the July 2011 Mumbai
bombings in India. We might consider whether to qualify some or
more of these acts as crimes against all of humanity rather than
crimes of particular interest only to the directly affected countries.
The amendment process would provide the right forum for this
debate because it creates the space for potentially achieving a general
international agreement for definitive inclusion or exclusion of such
one-off but massive criminal events and whether to make them a
shared responsibility for the ICC and its States Parties to prosecute
should they occur elsewhere in the future.
Fourth, a coherent and balanced approach to a new definition of
crimes against humanity will allow for a reasoned policy shift on the
part of the ICC. The fluidity of crimes against humanity under
customary international law shows that its definition in the Rome
Statute is more appropriately viewed as a policy choice on the part of
the ICC negotiators, rather than a codification of an accepted
understanding of the crime under international law. The fact that the
formulation of crimes against humanity is fundamentally a policy
decision demonstrates that it is more appropriate to acknowledge its
political implications in the amendment process, rather than to
attempt to shift its intended meaning through judicially led change
with all its attendant push back risks for the fledgling tribunal. By
simultaneously acknowledging that the law regarding crimes against
humanity is necessarily in a state of change, rather than being settled,
while requiring an international consensus to legitimize that change,
the Court will stay rooted in the treaty framework in which it was
originally envisioned. In that way, it will be more effective in its
loftily stated mandate in the preamble of its statute about helping put
an end to the culture of impunity.
In fact, the very high threshold of consensus, or two-thirds vote,
required to pass an amendment in Article 121 of the ICC statute
ensures that a degree of widespread agreement is reached such that it
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may be legitimately claimed afterwards that the position collectively
taken by the States Parties indicates a customary international law
definition of crimes against humanity. This will, in turn, pay
dividends because it would decrease the likelihood that, in
implementing obligations of the Rome Statute, national jurisdictions
would choose to go one way or the other on the State or
organizational policy issue.
Finally, moving well beyond the restrictive debates about
definitions of crimes against humanity in the ICC in particular,
which have been the limited focus of this article, perhaps the answer
to the problem of how to re-characterize crimes against humanity
may even lie elsewhere in legal philosophy. For example, Professor
May has offered what he called the security and international harm
principles as the essential justifications for crimes against
humanity.151 In his view, under the security principle, a State’s
involvement in perpetrating crimes against its own citizens acts as a
basis for other concerned States to step in to protect the victims or
offer them remedies for their harms.152 This argument resonates with
some of the errant State rationales modern governments have given
for the establishment of international tribunals. It is also consistent
with the direction that the international community is headed with
the widespread endorsement of the Responsibility to Protect
doctrine. Under the international harm principle that May offers,
abuses directed against a group are the types of harms that serve to
demarcate the cases deserving of international prosecutions versus
those requiring domestic action.153
Although May’s first principle returns the spotlight to State action,
the practical application of which was never in issue even under the
current definition in Article 7 of the Rome Statute, the second does
not necessarily do so. Rather, it focuses on the protection of groups,
which going by the existence of the Genocide Convention, have been
of interest since at least 1948 as requiring the collective protection of
the international community as a whole. It therefore offers what
151. MAY, supra note 16, at 12, 21 (detailing the two main reasons people may
oppose trials by international tribunals: they violate the rights of States and they
fail to be tolerant of diverse State practices).
152. Id. at 21 (stating that the security principle is essentially a limit on State
sovereignty).
153. Id. at 12, 21.
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might be termed a new way of thinking about a principled
justification for a specific international crime. Indeed, it appears selfevident that a retooling of the crimes against humanity standard in
the Rome Statute would, under May’s international harm principle,
place the focus not so much on the character of the entity developing
the policy and implementing it (whether State, State-like,
organization, or organization-like), the problem we encounter under
the current scheme, but rather the character of the wrongful conduct
or harm visited on the victims that would trigger collective action not
just by one State but by the community of States through
investigation, prosecution, and punishment through the ICC and
universal jurisdiction.
Keeping in mind such a theory, while not by itself sufficient to
resolve the specific question considered in this article, does help to
advance the conversation for States on what purpose an international
offense like crimes against humanity should serve for them and the
rest of humanity as human rights moves more and more to the center
stage in shaping global responses to international insecurity.

